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Introduction
0.1 Motivations
If we think about the history of human society as we know it, we can state
that it began around 10000 years ago, when the rst populations settled in the
fertile lands of the middle east. Under a macroeconomic and demographic point
of view, the more impressive and sizeable changes took place only in the last
2% of this period: until the beginning of 18th century, per capita income were
constant and around 1400$, then, growing at around 1.3-1.4% per year, the
per capita income reached today, in industrialized countries, 20000$ (Maddison,
2003). At the same time, population multiplied by more than six: in 1800
people were less than a billion. Again during the last 200 years, life expectancy,
that for millennia swinged between 20 and 35 years, soared up to almost 80
years in most industrialized countries. Average formal education, despite the
invention of writing took place 5000 years ago, were still negligible 200 years
ago, while nowadays people spend up to 20 years in acquiring education, from
parental nurture to tertiary education (Lee 2001). One hundred years ago a
worker could enjoy less than three years of retirement (usually associated to
bad health conditions), now people retire for almost one quarter of their life
and their pension benets are often paid by people of younger generations.
The aim of this dissertation is to jointly study, by means of microfounded
growth models, the abovementioned macroeconomic and demographic aspects
and some intergenerational, microeconomic issues that are described below. The
kind of microeconomic issues that we analyze share the common feature of de-
scribing links among generations, in a social and interpersonal fashion. Our
idea, based on the evidence shown above, is that, for millennia, the intergener-
ational behavior of di¤erent generations kept replicating itself, since the macro-
economic and demographic environment were stable and immobile. Conversely,
from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution onward, people face very signi-
cant changes in the macroeconomic and demographic variables within their own
life span and, in some ways, their behaviors contributes to the changes in the
"macro" environment itself. The links among generations are therefore mutable
because they are embedded in an economic environment that is all-changing in
its fundamental features.
This introduction is organized as follows: section 2 broadly describes the two
v
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microeconomic e¤ects on which we focus our analysis, section 3 resumes the rst
paper of the thesis, that addresses the presence of habit in education among
generations. Section 4 reviews the literatures on aging, technology adoption
and growth. Section 5 presents the second paper, where a taxonomy based
on demographic and economic features of economies is formulated. Section 6
resumes the third paper, where a politico-economic model of aging, technology
adoption and growth is implemented.
0.2 Intergenerational links: "micro" aspects in
a mutable "macro" world
In this work we focus our attention on two intergenerational aspects that in the
last two centuries experienced big transformations in their nature, due to the im-
pressive changes in the macroeconomic and demographic environment stressed
above: the inertia we nd in the transmission of education from one generation
to the next one and the e¤ects (and causes) of the increase in longevity on indi-
vidual and collective choices in terms of education and innovation technology.
Education at individual level shows a low degree of vertical mobility all over
the world: the inertia in the intrafamiliar transmission of education from one
generation to the next one seems to be, for a sizeable share, unexplainable by
standard economic theory (Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini, 1999). The evidence
collides with the fact that in many counties di¤erent form of roughly egalitarian
schools were introduced decades ago. The rst chapter of the thesis is devoted
to the issues of inertia in educational choices and macroeconomic e¤ects.
The lengthening of life expectancy that humanity is experiencing in the last
two centuries comes together with an impressive shift of production systems
toward knowledge and human capital intensive productions. In terms of in-
tergenerational links, two are the possible implications of these events: rst,
specic institutions are needed in order to maintain, hand down, process and
improve knowledge, such as schools, libraries, databases, etc. (Mokyr, 2002).
Second, having knowledge (and, in some ways, human capital) characteristics of
both an investment and a public good, the need for coordination mechanisms in
producing it is stronger than in the case of other types of factors of production
(i.e. physical capital). The aim of the second and third chapters is to introduce
this kind of analysis in a theoretical framework where the lengthening of life
expectancy is a cause, and in part a consequence, of peoples behavior, looking
at these people as at "generations of societies".
0.3 Chapter 1: "Intergenerational Links and Growth:
a Preferences Approach"
The paper in the rst chapter initially reviews the theoretical literatures on
habit formation (de la Croix, 1996 and 2001 and Banerjee, 2004 among others),
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multidimensional bequeathing (Viaene and Zilcha, 2001, Zilcha, 2003, Mookher-
jee and Ray, 2005) and "reference group" theory (Piketty, 2000 and Ray, 2003).
Empirical evidence about intra-family inertia in educational choices is reported
(Brunello and Checchi, 2003 and Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini, 1999). Ermisch
and Francesconi (2001) stress that an important step that needs to be done is
to disentangle the production process of human capital from the preferences of
individuals upon education.
In order to address this issue, we build an overlapping generations model able
to capture the inertia in individualseducational choices, that are driven by in-
dividual and aggregate variables. Agents are characterized by a utility function
where, together with the usual consumption, there are two altruistic ("warm
glow" specication) components: the nancial bequest that their children will
get once adult and the investment in their childrens education. The innovation
we introduce in the design of preferences is the presence of the habit term in
education expenditure, rather than in consumption. Moreover, the habit term
is constructed in order to take into account both familiar and social past his-
tory: the idea is that a parent more educated than the average of her generation
will invest a higher fraction of her income in her childrens education, and vice
versa. This mechanism, joint with the usual general equilibrium adjustment
of factorsprices (human and physical capitals rental rates), leads to di¤erent
steady states that are driven, in their nature, by the intensity of the habit. A
small habit concern leads the economy to a separate equilibrium: highly edu-
cated people will grow at a rate that is higher relative to the rate of growth
that characterized less educated people. Conversely, a big habit concern boosts
the counterbalancing e¤ect of general equilibrium adjustment and the economy,
after some oscillatory periods, converges to a unique steady state growth rate.
However, people separate completely in the investment they do: less educated
people end getting no education (and they only pass physical capital to their
children) while more educated people only end educating their children.
0.4 Aging, technology adoption and growth
The second and third chapters of this thesis jointly tackle some issues that char-
acterize nowadays economies, in particular the lengthening of life expectancy,
the increase in years spent both in education and in retirement (at the expenses
of working years), the shift toward knowledge and human capital intensive pro-
ductions, the big di¤erences in technological policies among quite similar coun-
tries. The idea is to joint together, into a unique theoretical framework, two
strands of literature: the one that studies the interactions among demographic
variables (in particular life expectancy) and economic growth and the other
that explores the politico-economic mechanisms that drives an economy toward
di¤erent innovation policies.
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0.4.1 Life expectancy and growth literature
One idea in this literature is that a causal link running from wealth indicators,
such as income or human capital, to life expectancy is in place and it is positive.
Historians, Biologists and economists support this view: Mokyr (1998) stresses
how both centralized innovations (R&D in chemistry, cures against cancer devel-
oped in hospitals and research centers, etc.) and knowledge-driven individual
behaviors (water sanitation, food storage, personal hygiene, etc.) led to the
dramatic rise of life expectancy in the last two centuries. Galor (2005) reports
that at the beginning of Industrial Revolution life expectancy was around 40
years. Lee (2001), for the US, nds that together with the increase in life ex-
pectancy, more than proportional increases in education and retirement periods
took places, making the share of lifetime devoted to work to shrink.
From a theoretical point, an increase in life expectancy has always been as-
sociated with more time spent in education, more human capital and therefore
higher level (or rates) of economic performance (Kuznets, 1973, Ram and Shultz,
1979, Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2000). Only in the last decade some contributions
that call into question this conclusion appeared: de la Croix and Licandro (1999)
and Boucekkine et al. (2002), through the introduction of vintage human capi-
tal, show that a growth-diminishing e¤ect arise because the more the population
ages, the more the human capital used in production depreciates, possibly lead-
ing to smaller growth rates. Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Blackburn and Issa
(2002) and Castellò-Climent and Doménech (2005), introducing the hypothesis
of endogenous life expectancy in the level of human capital, show that multiple
equilibria can exist: people living in economies in which life expectancy is too
short do not nd optimal to invest in human capital. In turns they will get a
low level of human capital, avoiding the next generation to experience increases
in life expectancy. This kind of poverty trap is avoided in the case initial life
expectancy is high enough to permit agents to invest in human capital: this
leads, generation by generation, to reach a higher steady state level (or growth
rate) in income.
0.4.2 Technology adoption literature
Among the vast strands of literature on technology, we focus on the one that
studies implementation, rather than the one on the invention, of new tech-
nologies. The latter literature is based on the Shumpeterian view of creative
destruction that takes place among competitive rms, or the processes of learn-
ing by doing and research and development that take place within the rms. In
the former literature, that we review in deep in chapter two, attention is on the
process that makes an already disposable technology1 to be put in place and ex-
ploited in the productive process. The analysis is about the costs and benets of
1The term "technology" has to be thought in a broad sense: it can include, apart from
the usual economic meaning, laws, norms, standardization systems, productive organization,
etc. that are not productivity-enhancing by themselves, but make the production of new
technology easier.
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the single actors of the economy and on the conict of interests that arise among
them: being economic units heterogeneous in di¤erent dimensions (consumers
vs producers, old vs adults, riches vs poors, etc.), rarely they will be together in
favour or against the introduction of a new technology. The decision to adopt
or not a superior technology is not the simple prot maximization problem of
producers, but comes out from a more complex political and economic mecha-
nism in which di¤erent groups (lobbies, governments, productive systems, etc.)
act together, driven by their own interests. The crucial point is, therefore, how
to nd the optimal "social" choice as the reection of the behaviors of the single
actors. Fundamental contributions in this literature come from the works of
Olson (1982), Bauer (1995) and Mokyr (2002).
0.5 Chapter 2: "Aging, Technology Adoption
and Growth: a Taxonomy"
The paper in chapter 2, by means of a simple OLG general equilibrium model,
puts together the links between the endogenous lengthening of life expectancy,
the technology adoption process and economic growth. Allowing life expectancy
to be endogenous, we introduce both the direct positive e¤ect on savings (driven
by the concern of agents in old age consumption) and the feedback e¤ect, run-
ning from the aggregate choices in terms of innovation and the life expectancy
itself. The main aim of this paper is to classify into three categories the way
economies develop, in terms of innovation choices and growth rates. The key
variables that characterize the economies come out to be the initial life ex-
pectancy, the cost-benet scheme of the innovation and the political weight of
di¤erent age classes. Two di¤erent e¤ects, coming from the population aging,
are isolated. One is called economic e¤ect and positively relates the incentive
of adults to innovate with life expectancy: the longer is agentslife, the more
they nd protable to pay the x cost of adopting a new technology, since they
need to nance a longer stream of consumption when old. The other is called
political e¤ect and negatively relates the aggregate incentive to innovate to life
expectancy: the bigger is the share of old people in the population, the heavier
is their political power. Since old are, by construction, against innovation (they
should pay today a cost that will give benets tomorrow, once they are dead),
in a simple majoritarian voting mechanism they will be pivotal once they get
the absolute majority.
Therefore, according to the initial and the upper bound2 of life expectancy,
the individual political weight3 and the parameters of utility function, produc-
tion function and technologic structure, an economy ends in one of the three
following states. A "stagnant economy" occurs whenever initial life expectancy
is very short or very long: in the former case is the economic e¤ect that binds, in
2The biological limit, say hundred and twenty years.
3Galasso and Profeta (2004) show that the turnout rate in political elections is increasing
with age.
x CONTENTS
the latter is the political one. A "stopping economy" is the case of a favorable
cost-benet of innovation but old people political weight is heavy. Finally, a
"growing economy" turns out to be the outcome when innovation is cheap and
old people have a light weight in the political mechanism.
0.6 Chapter 3: "A Politico-Economic Model of
Aging, Technology Adoption and Growth"
The last paper (joint with Francesco Lancia) presents a model built upon the
same scheme of the one in chapter 2, introducing some simplications but ex-
panding in several dimensions the analysis. The main simplication is to elim-
inate physical capital: in this way we can introduce a PAYGO pension system
and focus on the only other kind of investment, human capital. In fact we in-
troduce a third period in the agentslife: youth. They choose how to split their
youth time between education and unskilled work: as it happened in chapter
2, an increase in life expectancy makes people to invest more in the invest-
ment good. This time it is human capital, and in fact the model replicates
the empirical evidence of increasing in education with life expectancy. More-
over, adding one more age class makes the mechanism of preferences aggregation
more interesting: it can be the case that with a long enough life expectancy,
an innovation-oriented policy has to be supported by a coalition of age classes
(young and adults in our case).
The space of analysis is therefore over two dimensions: the private one and
the public one. The former refers to the incentives that young face when decid-
ing how long they will stay in school, given a certain life expectancy. It can be
the case that a poverty trap arises, because of a unfavorable private incentive
scheme. The latter must keep into account the way the individual incentives are
aggregated in one public choice: it can be the case that the same policy inter-
vention impacts di¤erently on di¤erent age classes. Given these two dimensions
and the fact that the economic and demographic environments evolve in time,
the timing of policy intervention is crucial when the aim of such policies is to
enhance growth.
Concluding, the lengthening of life expectancy, in the presence of technolo-
gies that allow to accumulate human capital, is a necessary, but not su¢ cient,
condition for sustained economic growth. Adverse conditions both on the pri-
vate side (high costs of investments in human capital, small productivity of
education system) and the public side (high social costs of entering in a new
technological paradigm, heavy weight of more conservative age classes) can mine
the reaching of a stage of economic evolution characterized by sustained growth.
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Chapter 1
Intergenerational Links and
Growth: a Preferences
Approach
1.1 Introduction
Links between intergenerational transfers and economic growth have been stud-
ied extensively in many di¤erent ways and in several contexts. What we nd
in the growth and human capital accumulation literature is that the emphasis
is often put on the production process of human capital and the choice of how
agents behave is functionally taken to be coherent with the assumed production
functions. We notice that the e¤ort macroeconomists put on micro-founding the
production side of growth models (human capital production, di¤erent compet-
itive environments, multi-sectoral production, etc.) does not nd a counterpart
in the "human" side, i.e. the agentsbehaviour. In this paper our aim is to
shift the emphasis from the production process of human capital to the deci-
sional process that heterogeneous agents (di¤erentiated both in the level of their
nancial wealth and in their level of human capital) face when they have to allo-
cate their wealth between their own consumption and resources left to the next
generations. Two specic questions encouraged us to face this approach. First,
how does parentseducation (of heterogeneous agents) at individual and aggre-
gate level inuence consumption, bequest and education decisions taken by their
children? Second, how do these decisions inuence aggregate economic growth
and individual wealth? The latter question has been quite deeply explored
under di¤erent viewpoints. Galor and Zeira (1993) introduce credit market im-
perfections and xed costs in human capital investment allowing for multiple
steady states: their second assumption, in contrast with Loury (1986), makes
an equilibrium with persistent inequality to possibly exist. Galor and Tsiddon
(1997) allow for two di¤erent types of externalities in the production side of the
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economy: one is local and refers to the intra-generational bequeathing of hu-
man capital, the other is global and refers to the TFP-augmenting e¤ect of the
average human capital in the economy. The main result is that poor but equal
economies face a trade-o¤ between two alternative growth-oriented policies: an
inequality-augmenting redistribution that brings to a high long run growth rate
with long run equality or an equality-preserving policy that, instead, brings to a
lower long run growth rate. Galor and Moav (2004), inspired by Moav (2002)s
work, build a general equilibrium model that uses the Classical approach of
increasing saving rates and a fully private human capital production function
to show how economic growth can be coherent with a time-varying relation be-
tween inequality and growth. The growth engine of the economy is, in the early
stage of industrial development, physical capital accumulation, while in more
recent development it is human capital accumulation that makes the economy
to grow. Viaene and Zilcha (2001) focus on the production-side of the human
capital accumulation process, introducing both public and in-house education
in a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth. The policy implications
that they draw are that high growth and inequality reduction can be achieved if
the resources left by parents to children are redistributed through a proportional
tax-public school scheme. If private e¤ort in educating children is dominant on
public education (or subsidized by government) the growth level could be the
same, but associated with a higher inequality level. What encouraged us to
focus both on human and physical capital investments comes from Mookherjee
and Ray (2005): they introduce a two-side bequeathing behavior of adults and
this assumption helps to expand the set of possible equilibria (and their types)
in which an economy ends up. In their paper adults care about the consequences
of bequests that they leave to their children: nancial bequest is a sort of "aid"
to the son because parent could not a¤ord the xed costs of education. In the
case of a wide range of training costs for the di¤erent kinds of education and a
weak bequest motive inequality is persistent in the long run.
Regarding the rst question motivating our analysis, Zilcha (2003) analyzes
di¤erent motivations of altruism of parents towards their children. He calls these
motives "education-inclined" and "bequest-inclined" types of altruism related
to parentsinvestments in education of their o¤spring and to nancial bequests,
respectively. He nds that economies face a trade-o¤ between growth and in-
equality, and the more an economy is "education-inclined", the more equal,
but slower, it will grow. Banerjee (2004) reviews very di¤erent ways to model
decision-making by families about human capital investments. He nds, in a
case that allows for joy-of-giving bequeathing of human capital, that the para-
meters describing the preferences of the adults about di¤erent kinds of bequests
drive the long run accumulation of human capital, conversely to the case of
pure altruism in which the long run behavior of the economy is only driven by
technological parameters and exogenous policy variables. Checchi, Ichino and
Rustichini (1999) try to solve what they call the "Italian puzzle": a country
where a roughly egalitarian education is associated with a strong social immo-
bility in terms of work and educational attainments. The authors explain this
anomaly considering the self condence that every agent puts on her talent, built
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through the observation of the past history of her own family. This mechanism,
combined with the distortion that public school introduces in the incentives to
spend in educating the descendents, gives rise to the observed inertia in the
mobility within each family.
Evidence regarding signicant di¤erences in investments in education and
in school attainment between countries has been documented in recent years
(among the OECD countries see, for example, Education at a Glance: OECD In-
dicators (2002), for other countries see: World Development Indicators (2000)).
Looking at the causality running from parental educational investment to school
attainment of children we nd that educational level and its dynamic show a
wide variety of scenarios. The determinants of childrens school attainment has
been widely empirically studied and we are particularly interested in analyzing
wealth and past educational determinants (i.e. the wealth of the parents and
their educational level). For example, Brunello and Checchi (2003) as well as
Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) found a positive correlation between parental
education and descendents education attainment. This correlation has been
found to be more signicant than the one with parentsincome. Glewwe and
Jacoby (2004) found that children enrolment is not signicantly driven by ex-
pected return on education, supporting our hypothesis that education is not
primarily an investment good but essentially, using Banerjees terminology, a
symbolic consumption good.
What characterizes our model is what de la Croix (1996, 2001) and Artige,
Camacho and de la Croix (2004) formalize in the agentschoices: an intergen-
erational handing down of "behaviors", called habit1 . The authors, analyzing
historical patterns of countries and cities cyclical rise and fall, nd how the
inherited consumption level of the economies can be taken into account to ex-
plain these waves. As it will become clear in a while, we prefer to investigate
the case of a habit attached to education. In our view it is crucial that when
agents make their choices, especially for what concerns the education of their
descendents, they take into account their personal history but also what hap-
pens around them. Indeed, they are inuenced by the level of education of the
whole society or neighborhood to which they belong, in a fashion that will be
explained in the next section. Another reason is an empirical one: data on
education are easily and straightforward to nd, relatively to data on house-
holdsconsumption, and the use of mincerian functions can allow us to derive
testable equations about the intergenerational persistence of human capital (i.e.
social immobility), whose explanation is far from clear. In facts, Ermisch and
Francesconi (2001), at the beginning of their paper, stress that "[...] in the
last two decades there has been an extensive body of empirical work concerned
with the links between parental investment in children and childrens outcomes,
particularly educational attainment. Most of these studies are implicitly em-
bedded in the household production model [...] but only a few of them attempt
to disentangle the households tastes from its technology in "producing" young
1We could have used other words instead of habit, for example reference point, aspirations,
etc. but, due to the strong similarity between our work and de la Croixs articles, we preferred
habit.
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peoples human capital". This statement, joint with Ray (2003)s2 and Piketty
(2000)s views of how people set their goals (and together with additional micro
literature), encourage us to explore this eld of research.3 To resume the ideas
presented above, our work can be described by three main characteristics: the
analysis is carried on for a simple dynamic economy populated by heterogeneous
agents, the focus is on what happens before the production of human capital
(at individual and aggregate level) and the social and familiar environments in
which agents live enter as driving forces of the economic behavior of the agents
themselves.
The model setting is an economy in which bi-dimensional heterogeneous
agents (in both human and nancial capital endowments) interact in both pro-
duction of nal good and in passing on nancial wealth and education to their
descendents. There is another type of interaction, a social one, due to the com-
parison of every agents educational level with that of the whole community
to which they belong. This comparison is instrumental to the decision of ed-
ucational investment of each agent4 . The particular behavior that arises leads
the economy to be characterized by two di¤erent types of steady states: one
that shows high-educated agents growing faster than the others and another, in
which habit matters are stronger, where all agents grow at the same rate but
fully divide, in terms of kind of supplied factors of production.
Anticipating a feature of the model, we nd that there is a sort of "hierarchy"
in educational choice, in the sense of bequeathing decisions: a parent will decide
to educate her descendent only if she is educated enough, given a xed amount
of wealth. Another feature of the model is that the benchmark that individuals
refer to in choosing whether to spend (and how much) or not in education is not
a function of their human capital alone (used as a proxy of their education), but
it is combined with the average human capital in the population. Accordingly,
above-average educated adults, conditionally on their wealth, will invest in their
descendentseducation a larger share of their wealth, relatively to below-average
educated adults. We will come back deeply to this point in the next section.
To conclude this introduction, we add that our view of education as a symbolic
consumption good (and not as an investment good) comes from the evidence of
a "myopic view" about return rates of education. One simple but representative
example in Italy is the strong reduction in enrolment rate in technical-scientic
university in the last ten year (for Italy: ISTAT (2005)) and, at the same time,
2 In a sense, in our model we put in practice the "aspirations window" to which Ray refers
to: we construct this window with the parentsand the average level of education. The gap
between this two measures is the goal that peope take as a benchmark level.
3"The reference group theory [...] has been particularly inuential. The basic idea of the
theory is that individuals tend to compare their social achievements to the reference group
from which they come from. [...] Assuming that dynastic heterogeneity in tastes does explain
a signicant fraction of the intergenerational persistence of inequality, the policy implications
are far from clear, however. The key question is where the heterogeneity of tastes comes from
and whether it can be altered", Piketty (2000).
4Gramsci (1975) stresses how familiar and social environments act, separately, in the for-
mation of "educational production attitude" of young children. What we introduce is the
interaction between the two environments (by means of the comparison between the familiar
and social human capital), focusing in particular on the choices of individuals.
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vast enrolment rates (up to thirty times the e¤ective demand, as Checchi and
Jappelli (2004) stress) in degrees like law or literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the main features
of the model, in section 3 we show the optimal behavior of agents and rms
and the di¤erent equilibria that the habit component can lead to, in section 4
we analyze in deep the dynamics driven by the habit weight, in section 5 some
simulations are shown and in section 6 we conclude.
1.2 The Model
The framework we adopt derives from the models by Zilcha (2003) and Artige,
Camacho and de la Croix (2004). The former allows for two type of bequests
(educational investment and nancial bequest) and heterogeneous agents, while
the latter, even if it is specied in a representative-agent environment, uses the
habit formation mechanism in a way that is easy to be modied for our purposes.
Agents live for two periods. The growth rate of the population is zero and
the size of population is normalized to one. When young, agents only acquire
human capital through educational expenditure of their parents, during adult-
hood they receive a nancial bequest from their parents and sell their human
capital inelastically on the labour market. Thus, their wealth derives from the
wage and the interest rate combined with the amounts of human capital and
nancial bequest, respectively, that they are endowed with. Adults split their
wealth among consumption, a nancial bequest for their descendents and an
educational expenditure. In every period rms produce, in a perfectly competi-
tive environment, a single good that can be consumed, accumulated as physical
capital or spent by adults in childrens education.
1.2.1 Endowments
The economy starts in t0 = 0 with an adult generation (named "0") and a young
generation: the name of a generation comes from the time in which it becomes
adult. At time t all the capital stock is owned by the adults and the endowment
of agent i is bit 1 = xit, the nancial bequest given by adult i of the foregoing
generation. Each adult is endowed with hit units of human capital.
The wealth of agent i is given by
yit = wthit +Rtxit (1.1)
where wt is the competitive market wage and Rt is the return rate on nan-
cial investments. This wealth will be used by the agent to nance consumption,
cit, leave a nancial bequest bit and spend on education for her descendent, eit:
cit + bit + eit  yit (1.2)
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1.2.2 Preferences
Every agent has the same utility function, given by:
Uit = log cit +  log bit +  log(eit   ait) (1.3)
where bit is the nancial bequest given by the adult and eit is the contribu-
tion of educational expenditure to the utility function. We have joy-of-giving
motivation in both the kinds of bequest. The term ait is the stock of educational
habit. We assume that while evaluating the utility gain given by educational
expenditure, the adult faces a certain habit: the higher her habit, the more she
will spend to educate her descendent, in order to gain a given utility level. The
constant  weights this habit, that is dened in the following way:
ait = hit   ht
where ht is the average human capital of the adult generation in the economy
(assuming population dimension constant and equal to one). In this specica-
tion the more an adult is above the average (in terms of human capital, i.e.
"broad education"), the more she will spend in her descendants education. An
important aspect is that ait can take also negative values, and this happens for
adults with below-average human capital. Our choice for the habit term comes
from two considerations.
The rst is that human capital is quite di¤erent from a consumption or in-
vestment good: usually, in works allowing for habit formation in consumption,
there is an habit term given by a fraction of the consumption of the previ-
ous periods generation. Sometimes the reference level is set to be the average
consumption in the population: this is the catching-up-with-the-Johneses liter-
ature. In this work our aim is to give to human capital a more social, rather
than a strictly atomistic, economic interpretation: what we want to build up is
a "...benchmark [...] level determining a goal to reach for the new generation"
(de la Croix (2001)) introducing a measure for this "human capital benchmark"
that embodies both intra-family and inter-family comparison. The idea is that
a reasonable benchmark level would be the educational level of the person who
decides for the education of her descendent, relatively to the educational level
that prevails in the community where she lives. What we have in mind is that
with low level of average education it is easier for the high-skilled professions to
be passed vertically from one generation to the next one. Or, in other words,
less inequality in education tends to minimize the inertia of this habit to be
bequeathed through successive generations. We again stress that here we are
modeling the preferences of individuals, included education: issues concerning
the production of human capital will be faced in the next subsection.
The second consideration is a technical one. We could have used a parameter
to weight the term ht, but with the specication we use we can ideally separate
the general equilibrium e¤ect (GEE) from the habit e¤ect (HE). The GEE refers
to the inverse relation between the relative abundance of a factor of production
and its relative market price: in a dynamic economy this e¤ect describes the
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"natural" tendency of the rates of return of the factors of production to stabilize
around a steady state level. As in a Solow model with human and physical
capital (Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)), at the steady state the return rates
of both factors are constant (or both growing at a given rate, for example, equal
to an exogenous TFP growth rate) and their relative rate is constant. The HE
refers to the dynamic handing down of the bias in agentsinvesting behavior. As
we will show clearly in subsection 3.3, the distance-from-average specication
makes the disentanglement of the two discussed e¤ects easier.
1.2.3 Technologies
The production technology of the single good in the economy can be described
by a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas function that uses human capital
and physical capital as inputs. At time t production is:
Yt = AK

t H
1 
t 0 <  < 1 (1.4)
where A is a constant TFP, Kt is the aggregate physical capital (that fully
depreciates in one period) and Ht is the aggregate human capital. These ag-
gregates are given by the total amount of nancial bequests left by adults of
generation t   1 and by the total amount of human capital of the adults of
generation t, respectively.
Adult is human capital, hit, is privately produced, as in Artige, Camacho
and de la Croix (2004), with a linear technology that transforms one to one
educational expenditure of the parents in human capital of their descendents
(1.5). This simple production function is used in order to focus the analysis on
the choice-side of the economy, leaving computations lighter .
hit = eit 1 (1.5)
1.3 The Equilibrium
In this section we describes the optimization problems of the two sides: con-
sumers maximize their utility, rms maximize their prots.
1.3.1 Consumers
The member i of generation t maximizes her utility function (2.1), choosing eit
and bit, under the budget constrain, (1.1) and (1.2), and the two other constrains
(1.6) and (1.7):
max f0; aitg  eit  yit (1.6)
bit  0 (1.7)
The double inequality in (1.6) indicates that the habit could have a wide
range of inuence on educational decisions. In what follows, we will see formally
how this can be the case.
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As in Zilcha (2003) and Cardak (2004), adults do not care about earning
capacity of their descendents, and they do not have nested utility functions à
la Barro, either. They are only interested in the educational expenditure that
they do and in the amount of nancial bequest leaved to their descendants. This
allows us to separate the motivations that drive intergenerational bequeathing
in this model: the former of "status" motivation, as in Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992), and the latter for the "economic" motivation. Within this specication,
adults only form expectations about next periods rate of return for what con-
cerns the nancial bequest. FOCs, (1.5) and the simplifying identity xit+1 = bit
bring, for agent i, the optimal choice of eit and bit:
eit =

1 + + 
(wthit +Rtxit) +
(1 + )
1 + + 
(hit   ht) (1.8)
bit =

1 + + 
(wthit +Rtxit)  
1 + + 
(hit   ht) (1.9)
where hit+1 and xit+1 are the human and physical capital owned by agent
is descendent. These equations hold until the habit term is not too high or too
low relatively to the agents wealth. With a too high habit term, we would not
have a well-dened utility function and we assume that the habit weight  can
not be "too large". Later on we will dene the exact magnitude of UB , the
Upper Bound value that the habit weight can not exceed and how to calculate it.
Conversely, a very low habit (for example when the agent is so poorly educated
to be much below the average) makes the marginal utility of the educational
investment always lower than its marginal cost: the agent will split her wealth
only between consumption and nancial bequest. In this case the agent will
maximize her utility function in the corner solution dened by eit = 0. The
nancial bequest will be:
bit =

1 + 
(wthit +Rtxit)
Referring to 1.8 and 1.9 and taking into account the example above, it is clear
that the shares of wealth that agents invest in education and nancial bequests
are not the same for everybody. On the contrary, for each agent they depend
both on the private and average human capital. This shows how important are,
in determining the individual and aggregate investments in human and physical
capital that ow from one generation to the other, both the magnitude and the
composition of individual wealth: in fact, for example, agents endowed with the
same wealth can split it in very di¤erent ways, depending on where their wealth
comes from. This is a point that we want to underline: also variables other than
the "pure" wealth can (and, actually, do) drive the choices of individuals and
we are proposing a way to do it. At this stage of the analysis, it is very useful to
show our results by means of a graph. Figure 1 shows how agents choose how to
split their wealth as a function of their human and physical capital endowments.
The loci (HH) and (XX) divide the rst quadrant in three regions: region (I),
corresponding to relatively low educated agents, region (II) where agents have
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an educational level around the average of the distribution in the economy (ht)
and region (III) where agents are high educated. People in region (I) choose to
invest only in nancial bequests, people in region (II) invest in both educational
and nancial bequest and people in region (III) pass on only education. The
dashed isowealth line represents the idea stressed above: it could be the case
of agents endowed with the same wealth that choose di¤erently how to split it.
The loci (HH) and (XX) are characterized by the equations
xit =
ht(1 + )
Rt
 

(1 + ) + wt
Rt

hit (HH)
xit =   
Rt
ht +
   wt
Rt
hit (XX)
that are obtained, for given values of wt and Rt, equating (1.8) and (1.9) to
zero and solving for xit. It is easy to verify that if  equals zero the two loci
disappear because the "bequests biases" due to the habit are zero.
Figure 1. Agents behave conditionally on their endowments of human and
physical capital. The dashed isowealth line shows that agents
with the same wealth can behave in three di¤erent ways.
The intuition behind the behavior described above is that an agent with a
little amount of human capital (relatively to the average human capital in the
economy) would not feel educating her descendent crucial, and if her nancial
endowment is not so high, she would prefer to consume and to leave only nan-
cial bequest. Di¤erently to the case of other works (for example Galor and Zeira
(1993)) in which there are indivisibilities in human capital accumulation, this
time it is the particular utility function that allows for non-convexities in both
human and nancial capital production at individual level. In gure 2 we show,
now looking at a single agent with a given wealth and with di¤erent habits, the
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di¤erent choices that she can make.
Figure 2. How di¤erent habits lead agents
to split the same total wealth.
The grey simplex represents the budget constrain of the agent in the space of
consumption, nancial investment and educational investment. The maximiza-
tion of utility under the budget constrain can give rise to the three di¤erent
behavior described above. The choice is of type (I) if the habit term is strongly
negative (imagine a standard convex isoutility surface that is shifted to the left
by the negative term a0it): educational expenditure will be zero due to its high
marginal cost, higher than its marginal utility. Choice of type (II), therefore
an interior solution, is the result of a low habit concern: in the limiting case
of  = 0 the wealths shares that goes in consumption, educational investment
and nancial bequest are 11++ ,

1++ and

1++ , respectively. The more the
habit term increases, the more the choice is biased toward investment in educa-
tion. Once the habit term reaches a00it, all agents wealth goes in educational
investment, represented by type (III).
1.3.2 Firms
Firms produce in a perfectly competitive environment. The producersinverse
demand for factors of production is: Rt = Ak
 1
t and wt = (1 )Akt , where
kt =
Kt
Ht
. In turns, Kt =
P
i
xit and Ht =
P
i
hit.The share of production that
goes to human capital is therefore (1 ), while the one going to physical capital
is .
1.3.3 Intertemporal Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium, given historical distributions of human and physical
capital in the population in t = 0, is a sequence of xit; hit; wt; Rt;Ht;Kt and ht;
t = 1; 2; : : : such that:
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a) each adult i selects the amounts of the two type of bequest optimally,
given her endowments, market prices and habit;
b) this decisions aggregate to Ht+1 and Kt+1, according to (1.5) and the
identity xit+1 = bit;
c) wt and Rt equal the marginal productivity of human capital and phys-
ical capital, respectively.
The rst step is to show the individual accumulation functions (of human and
physical capital). Agent i behaves accordingly to her endowments of human and
physical capital, that enter both in the determination of her wealth and habit.
Moreover, the average level of human capital enters in the agents decisions, too.
Therefore the accumulation functions for agent i takes di¤erent forms when she
is in di¤erent situation: if the agent is in region (I), that means that she is
endowed with relatively low wealth and a low level of education, she will pass
to her descendent only physical capital, independently on the magnitude of the
habit weight:
hit+1 = 0 (8 I)
xit+1 =

1 + 
(wthit +Rtxit) (9 I)
An agent in region (II), that is to say not too far from the average wealth
and education, will pass both physical and human capital accordingly to the
two following equations:
hit+1 =

1 + + 
(wthit +Rtxit) +
(1 + )
1 + + 
(hit   ht) (8 II)
xit+1 =

1 + + 
(wthit +Rtxit)  
1 + + 
(hit   ht) (9 II)
An agent in region (III), very (relatively) highly educated and not too much
wealthy, will spend everything she got in educating her descendent, indepen-
dently from the habit weight:
hit+1 = wthit +Rtxit (8 III)
xit+1 = 0 (9 III)
We focus on individuals because of the intractability of aggregate dynamic
behavior of the economy. The impossibility to give an analytical characteri-
zation of the dynamics originates from the technical way in which human and
physical capital aggregates: in the previous subsection we have derived the ex-
pressions of the wage and the rate of return and they are both dependent on
kt , that in turns depends on the aggregate value of human and physical capital.
The heterogeneity of agents (complicated by the two types of heterogeneity:
in human and nancial capital) makes impossible to write the expressions of
wt+1 and Rt+1. Notice that the same behavior could have been obtained with
other more complex human capital production functions, due to the double joy-
of-giving specication in the utility function. The use of a linear specication
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allow us to derive some analytical properties of the equilibria in the steady state
analysis.
Now we want to investigate what types of equilibria and dynamics our model
allows for: the two-dimensional heterogeneity of individuals is a source of very
di¤erent initial congurations that can describe a broad types of economies. For
example it is easy to show that an "equal" economy, in terms of personal wealth,
can be populated by individuals with very di¤erent endowments of physical and
human capital. Indeed, this could bring agents of each type to behave in di¤erent
ways with respect to educational investment, consumption and nancial bequest.
Moreover, what we will nd is that the habit weight change radically the kind
of steady state reached, while, due to the strong linearity of the model, initial
conditions impact only on the transitiondynamics and not on the steady states
features.
Our strategy is to split the population in two groups 1 and 2, weight them
 and (1 ) and check which are the determinants of the steady state reached
and how it is reached. We assume, from now on, that, at time t = 0, agents
belonging to group 2 are relatively more abundant in human capital than the
ones in group 1, i.e. h20   h10 > 0. Notice that the expression of the intensive
capital is given by kt =

x1t+(1 )x2t
h1t+(1 )h2t

.
The benchmark case: representative agent or  = LB = 0
In this subsection, we begin with what we call the benchmark case, that can be
both the case of representative agent or the case of habit weight equal to zero
(we refer to this zero-weight, the Lower Bound value of , with LB): using
(2.3), (1.8), (1.9) and noting that the habit term equals zero, we get the growth
rate (common for wealth, human capital and physical capital):
gLB =
A1 
1 + + 
  1 (1.10)
Regions (I) and (III) disappear due to  = 0, the representative agent (or the
agents) evolves always in region (II). Both physical and human capital grow at
the same steady state growth rate gLB and the intensive capital kt is constant:
kLB =

 . This is, trivially, the rate between the share of wealth passed by in
nancial bequest and the share of wealth spent in education of the adults (or the
adults) descendent(s). The dynamics are driven by equations (8II) and (9II),
without the second additive terms that describes the habit formation mechanism
(with or without the su¢ x i, that disappear in the case of the representative
agent). In the representative agent case, due to the homotheticity of the utility
function and the linear production function of human capital, the wealth shares
that each agent spends in education and in nancial bequeathing are the same,
so the growth rate is the same for both the groups, as we showed before. The
only e¤ect that acts in this case is the GEE that sets, instantaneously, the
relative return rate between the two factors of production constant.
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The "extreme case":  = UB
Before describing how to nd UB and what it represents we have to make one
assumption about the parameters of utility and production functions, in order
to have a coherent behavior of agents. We impose, from now on5 :
1  

>

1 + 
(1.11)
This assumption, that concerns the "net-of-habit" link between productivity
of factors of production and bequeathing behavior of agents, states that the rate
between the share of production going to human capital (1   ) and the share
of production going to physical capital () is bigger than the rate between the
share of wealth devoted to education () and the share of wealth devoted to
other causes (1+), i.e. consumption and nancial bequest. In dynamic terms,
this means that there is a natural primacy in earning power of education: the
assumption above avoids that the advantage that agents get being educated is
not harmed by the preferences for education (), in the sense that the investment
in human capital does not make the return rate on education to be so small (due
to the relative accumulation of human capital itself with respect to physical
capital) to make more educated agents worst. Our assumption plausibly hold
because, from the literature, we nd for  a value around 0.25, and we assume
that the main argument in the utility function is consumption:  and  are
hypothesized to be smaller than one.
We dene the "extreme case" a steady state in which the economy evolves
with the two groups completely separated: one passes only human capital, the
other only nancial capital. In the following of this subsection we study the
properties of the steady state and the conditions on the parameters that make
it happen. Analytically, we impose that group 1 evolves according to equations
(8 I) and (9 I) and group 2 evolves according to equations (8 III) and (9 III), that
is group 1 passes only nancial capital while group 2 invests only in educating
their descendents. Expliciting the expression of wt, Rt and then kt, we get:
h2t+1 = wth2t = h2t(1  )A

x1t
(1  )h2t

(8 III)
x1t+1 =

1 + 
Rtx1t =

1 + 
x1tA

x1t
(1  )h2t
 1
(9 I)
Notice that, since we have assumed that the two groups evolve in region
(I) and (III), respectively, these equations are independent from . Due to
expressions (8 III) and (9 I) we have endogenous growth, so the equilibrium
will be a constant and equal growth rate of human and physical capital and,
5We make this assumption at this stage to leave the description above as general as we can.
If this condition would not hold, the implied dynamics of the economy would give birth to
equilibria, with persistent or diverging oscillating dynamics of the economys stock variables.
Although these cases are very interesting to study, we are mainly interested in more tractable
cases, that are the ones described in this section.
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as a consequence, a constant k. We can write the expression of steady state
intensive capital, kUB , looking at the steady state ratio between (9 I) and (8
III):
kUB =
x1
(1  )h2 =

1 + 

1   (1.12)
For this to be the case, agents in group 1 have to pass only physical capital
and agents in group 2 have po pass only education. Since the two loci (XX) and
(HH) are dynamic and their evolution depend on the investments in physical
and human capital done by the agents, we have to impose that two dynamic
conditions have to hold simultaneously:
x1t+1(x1t;h2t) < x^1t+1(x1t;h2t) \ h1t+1(x1t;h2t) > h^1t+1(x1t;h2t)
where x^1t+1 and h^1t+1 are the intercept of (HH) with the xit axis and the
intercept of (XX) with the hit axis in gure 1, respectively. In other words, in
steady state the evolution of the two bounds does not have to make the agents
to change their behaviors. Simple calculations using (8 III), (9 I), (XX), (HH)
and (1.12), combined with assumption (1.11), lead to:
 > UB =
(1  )(1 )A



1 + 

(1.13)
In (1.13) we have a condition on the parameters that ensures that the two
groups evolve exactly in the way we have described above. The steady state
growth rate of the economy is, in this case,
gUB =
x1t+1   x1t
x1t
=
h2t+1   h2t
h2t
= UB 1 = (1 )(1 )A


1 + 

 1
(1.14)
As expression (1.14) shows, the growth rate is common for both the groups
and independent on : the idea is that, having a very high concern about past
behavior ( equal to UB), each group "choose" a single type of capital in which
invest, that means that the two groups completely specialize. In this extreme
case the growth rate does not depend on  because agents in group 1 split their
wealth only between consumption and nancial bequest, while agents in group 2
spend everything in educating their descendents. The two groups are therefore
"forced" to stay on the two opposite corner solutions (in gure 2, the choices (I)
and (III)) at the hand of their own high habits: this implicitly impedes them
to benet from the further "degree of freedom" of investing in the other kind
of capital. In this case the strong HE separates completely the two groups and
the GEE can work only in the domain of x1 and h2: this restriction makes the
only possible equilibrium the one in which the growth rate is the same for both
groups. In the next section it will become clear how the possibility to invest in
both types of capital gives, to one of the two groups, the possibility to exploit
one additional degrees of freedom with respect to the other group.
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1.4 Dynamics in the intermediate habit case
In this section we study the dynamics in the case of LB <  < UB . We hy-
pothesize, in this section, that the two groups are endowed with similar amounts
of human capital and nancial capital and that their total wealth is the same.
These assumptions do not change our qualitative results but help us to better
describe the dynamic behaviors of the agents. In this section it is important to
keep in mind how the economy behaves in correspondence of the two extreme
bounds of  and which are the e¤ects that enter the game: only the GEE in
the case of  = LB = 0 and the HE and a "restricted" GEE in the case of
 = UB .
Now we analyze the temporary equilibrium in the case of small values of
. This means that adults face a mild habit (a sort of positive or negative
externality) in doing their educational expenditure.
1.4.1 The short run
Using (8 II) and (9 II) and the expressions of wage and return rate, we get, at
least for some periods, again the same stationary results for aggregate human
and physical capital than in the previous sub-case. The intensive capital is con-
stant because of the habit termsforms we choose in (8 II) and (9 II): adding
up h1t+1 (x1t+1) and h2t+1 (x2t+1) to get the stock of human (physical) capital,
the distance-from-average specication makes the habit terms to cancel6 . As a
consequence we claim that when both groups belong to region (II) wage and
return rate are constants. In other words, in this models specication aggregate
human and physical capital are independent from the distribution of the human
capital itself across the population. What changes is the relative wealth and the
dynamics of human and physical capital at group level, due to the externality
given by the inherited habit, that drives up or down the opportunity cost of
the di¤erent investments that each adult can do. Accordingly to the forego-
ing denitions, the force that drives the dynamics of the economy comes from
the HE, rather than from the GEE. Given the hypotheses of "similar agents"
endowed with the same wealth, referring to gure 1 there are two groups that
belong to a generic isowealth line, in the segment between (XX) and (HH). In
other words, both the two groups choose an internal point of the simplex in
gure 2. Two pairs of equations describe the dynamics, one set of (8 II) and
(9 II) for each group. It is possible to show that the growth rates of the two
groups diverge from one period to the other combining (8 II), (9 II) and (1.1),
remembering that the wealth of the two groups at time t are assumed to be
equal and (h2t   h1t) > 0 by assumption:
gy1t =
y1t+1   yt
yt
= gLB + G1

h2t   h1t
yt

(1.15)
6As we stressed in subsection 2.3 and (not reported) simulations show, an alternative
specication of the habit term could have been something like: ait = hit   ht. The further
weight  that people attach to the social measure of human capital would only complicate the
mathematics but would not add signicant new issues to tackle.
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gy2t =
y2t+1   yt
yt
= gLB + G2

h2t   h1t
yt

(1.16)
where the constants G1 and G2 are negative and positive, respectively, holding
(1.11). Both G1 and G2 are constants, functions of A, , ,  and .7 The
expressions above show clearly how the two e¤ects described above work: the
GEE contributes with a growth rate equal to gLB , while the HE, proportionally
to , boosts in opposite directions the second addictive terms of the growth
rates. We summarize that (11) makes the habit to have a positive (negative)
level e¤ect on the educational investment of the more (less) educated group
(look at expression (1.8)) and a positive (negative) growth rate e¤ect on the
wealth of the more (less) educated group. We claim that if two groups at
time t are characterized by the same wealth level and similar endowments of
human and physical capital, the one more educated will show, at least for some
periods, a higher and increasing growth rate. In fact, the assumption of similar
endowments makes agents to be in region (II) and to choose a composition
of human and physical capital that leads them again to region (II). With the
same wealth the expression h2t+1   h1t+1 > 0 holds from (8 II) and, under
assumption (1.11), y2t+1   y1t+1 > 0 holds, too. It is so straightforward that,
for some periods, gy2t > gy1t.
1.4.2 The long run
We have described how the economy behaves in the rst periods: in fact, after
some periods the less educated group will end to be "trapped" in region (I)
and therefore will stop to invest in education. This is because the di¤erential
term (h2t  h1t) is always increasing, lowering the growth rate and, at the same
time, the level of human capital of group 1. This causes the habit of this
group to decrease the marginal utility of education so much that its opportunity
cost would not justify the investment in the education itself. The dynamic
that arise from now on is one in which group 1 passes only education, while
group 2 continues to pass both nancial and human capital. When group 1
stops to invest in human capital, the relative rate of return between the two
factors of productions adjusts through the GEE: the intertemporal equilibrium
is reached once the production factorsrates of growth and the intensive capital
are constant. The main message is, therefore, that after some period the less
educated group loses its educational lever while the other group can adjust
between both educational and nancial bequeathing to reach the maximum
utility level.
As we have explained above, the case of group 1 evolving in region (I) and
group 2 in region (II) could be the dynamic that arises at the end of a transitory
time span during which the two groups invest in both education and nancial
capital. It could be the case, however, of an economy that begins already in
this situation (that can arise from higher values of ): a part of its population
7Precisely, G1 =
(1 )A(

)( (1+)(1 ))
1++
and G2 = G1(
 
1  ). The signs come
straightforwardly from (1.11).
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is more educated and, apart from passing some nancial capital, educates their
descendents. The other part of the population only passes nancial capital. We
let (1.11) to hold, so we can also analyze the evolution of the economy described
above: an economy in which two groups start with similar endowments of human
and physical capital but, because of habit in educational investment, one of the
two groups ends stopping to invest in education, once its opportunity cost is
too high relatively to its marginal utility.
Formally we describe these cases (both the one with higher  and the second
time span of the case of lower , when group 1 have already stop to invest
in human capital) with three accumulation equations. The rst describe the
evolution of nancial bequests in group 1 : note that the bequest is a constant
fraction of the wealth characterizing each agent belonging to the group. The
second and third equations describe the evolution of physical and human capital
of agents in group 2, respectively:
x1t+1 =

1 + 
 
Ak 1t x1t

x2t+1 =

1 + + 
 
(1  )Akt h2t + Ak 1t x2t
  
1 + + 
h2t
h2t+1 =

1 + + 
 
(1  )Akt h2t + Ak 1t x2t

+
(1 + )
1 + + 
h2t
The analyses of the steady state and the dynamic will be carry on through
simulations because, as it will become clearer in a while, a simple analytical
solution for the steady state is not available: the strategy is to look at the
behavior of the economy, conditional on the value of the habit weight, . First
of all, notice that kt =
x1t+(1 )x2t
(1 )h2t . Remember that, maybe after a transitory
as described in the previous subsection, h1t+1 = h1t = 0: this means that agents
in group 1 have no human capital and choose not to invest in human capital for
their descendents. The growth rate of intensive capital is constant if and only
if:
gx1t
1 +

1 


x2t
x1t
+
gx2t
1 +


1 

x1t
x2t
= gh2t:
This relation between growth rates and levels of endowments of human and
physical capital directly arises taking the di¤erence of the expression of kt above
and equating it to zero. The key issue is that, in equilibrium, two only possible
cases can arise: (i) gx1 = g

x2 = g

h2 or (ii) g

x1 < g

x2 = g

h2, where the inequality
sign comes from (1.11). The equality between gx2 and g

h2 holds because, dur-
ing the transition toward the steady state, under the hypothesis gx1t < gx2t8
eventually x2tx1t goes toward innity and in this case the contribution of gx1t in
8This, in turn, is implied by the short run analysis above through the hypothesis that
(h20   h10) > 0.
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determining gh2t weights zero and, in an analogous way, the denominator of the
second fraction equals one. The rst main conclusion here is that two are the
possible types of steady state: the former implies a wealths growth rate equal
for the two groups, the latter an higher growth rate for the group that invests
in human capital.
The kind of equilibrium reached and the dynamics that lead the economy
to the specic equilibrium depend on the weight of the forces that interplay
in the economy: remember that in subsection 3.3.1, in which  = 0, only the
GEE is in action while in subsection 3.3.2, where the habit is very strong, the
HE forces the economy to experience a corner solution. We stress that in this
intermediate case it is not possible to disentangle the GEE from the HE (due
to the impossibility to properly characterize the dynamics and the steady state
of the three-equations system above), but what we can say is that these e¤ects
work together and we can describe the adjusting mechanism as a two-blocks
control system: the GEE works until kt is constant, no matter if, in the end,
x1t vanishes with respect to x2t or it grows at the same rate. The GEE does
not depend on , it is an intrinsic characteristic of this kind of models. The HE
works independently from the GEE: what it does is to bias (toward or against
educational expenditure, according to the sign of the expression (hit   ht)) the
choices of how to split the wealth of each adult. The higher is , the stronger
is the HE. Our aim is to nd the threshold value of the habit weight, L, below
which the economy ends up with di¤erent growth rates for the two groups and
above which the two groups grow at the same rate.
1.5 Simulations
In the simulations that we run we set the parameters values following the
considerations mentioned in subsection 3.3.2. From the literature we set  =
0:25. Since we have assumed that the main subject in the utility function is
consumption, the weights of the nancial and educational bequests are less than
unity ( = 0:3 and  = 0:5). Thinking about generations that born every thirty
years, we chose the TFP, A, to be equal to 10, in order to have a standard annual
growth rate of about 3%9 . This parametersvalues make (1.11) to strongly hold,
so we rule out the case of a di¤erent inequality sign that would make possible
di¤erent dynamics, as explained in the notes. Without loss of generality, the
economy is splitted in two groups of the same size, so  = 0:5. We let  to
vary and we observe how the economy behaves, in terms of both dynamics and
steady states.
With low values of  (in our simulations positive values smaller than L =
9From expression (1.10) the ratio between production in generation t + 1 and production
in generation t equals A
1 
1++
: If a new generation borns every 30 years, we have to solve
gann =
h
A1 
1++
i 1
30   1 to obtain the annual growth rate of the economy. We call gann
the standard growth rate because we look at the growth rate that would prevail without the
habit mechanism.
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6:8867) the steady state that is reached by the economy is one that involves
di¤erent growth rate for the two groups: this is case (ii). What we can say is
that if habit is weak (once that we have assumed to be in the case of group
1 in region (I) and group 2 in region (II), the only habit intensity to take
into account is the one of group 2 ) the positive (negative) contribution in the
accumulation of human (physical) capital for group 2 is not enough to raise the
return rate on physical capital so much to make group 1s wealth to grow faster
than group 2s wealth. In other words, the GEE "does its job" before the HE
have given to group 1s agents the possibility to exploit the high return rates on
physical capital given by the GEE itself. The result is that the two groups grow
at di¤erent rates: group 1s agentswealth grows at the same rate than their
nancial capitals growth rate, gx1, while group 2s agentswealth grows at the
rate gx2 = g

h2, higher than g

x1. Moreover, this case of low values of  is the only
case compatible with a past history characterized by all the agents in region (II)
investing in both types of capital, described in the previous subsection.
Higher values of  (with L <  < UB = 7:8996) imply a stronger HE
and this leads to a strongly unbalanced habit-driven accumulation biased to-
ward human capital (for group 2, while there is a strong preference toward
nancial investment for group 1 ). The e¤ects are again shown by the three
dynamic equations above: for given y2t and h2t a high value of  leads group
2 to strongly accumulate human capital and weakly accumulate physical cap-
ital (anyway, we stress that the constraints (1.6) and (1.7) have to hold). As
before the GEE raises the return rate on physical capital and lowers the wage
rate, but this time habit-induced variations are so big (especially looking at Rt)
that in later periods group 1s agents, whose wealth comes only from physical
capital, experience a high growth. This in turn contributes one to one to the
high level of gx1t so, at some point in time, the growth rate of the aggregate
physical capital will be higher that the growth rate of human capital: the GEE
now reverses and an opposite situation occurs. So, conversely to the case of
small habit, the GEE works only asymptotically because the HE is so strong
to make the economys characteristic variables (growth rates, intensive capital
and return rates) to uctuate around a steady state level. In other words, the
HE acts as a feedback that stabilize the growth rate of the three accumulating
variables around the same steady state growth rate. Being all equal the growth
rates, ratios between di¤erent stock variables are constants, in particular y2ty1t is
constant and its steady state value decreases as  increases: this means that
if the habit is high, educated people invest a lot in their childrens education
and these massive investments in education make the wage rate to fall and,
as a consequence, to lose the earning advantage that, in the case of the GEE
completely exhausted, education would give.
When  reaches UB , the economy perfectly separates: one group will invest
only in human capital and the other only in physical capital. This is the case
that we have studied in subsection 3.3.2.
In the following simulations, group 1 is always represented by a continuous
line, group 2 by a dashed line. In this rst simulation (gure 3a) the two group
begin with the same wealth level, but group 2, as we have assumed in section
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3.3, is more educated (i.e. has more human capital). We set  = 1:4: both
the two groups pass, for 12 periods, both nancial and educational bequests.
Wage and return rate are temporarily constant. Since (1.11) holds, referring to
(1.16) is clear that agents of group 2 experience a growth rate always higher
than agents of group 1. After this time span educational investment is no more
preferred to agents belonging to group 1, due to the decreasing marginal utility
driven by the habit term, and from now on the economy evolves with the two
groups proceeding at two paces. This is the case in which, using the terminology
of the previous section, there is a mild habit, where the GEE fully works before
the HE had time to change "too much" the relative return rate of the factors
of production. The higher is the habit weight , the shorter is the time span
during which all agents invest in both types of capital.
When we look at the di¤erential between the two groupssteady state growth
rates, we do not nd a clear relationship with the habit weight, because it de-
pend in a non-trivial way also on parameters other than : in gures 3b and 3c
we graph the steady state wealths growth rates as functions of  both in our
standard case and in a case in which we change parameter  from 0:5 to 0:1
(that is, to give less weight to descendentseducation in adultsutility function).
Note that, holding (1.11), UB does not depend on : what happen is that the
region in which non-complete-separation and same growth rate coexist narrows.
gure 3a: dynamics of growth rates with low habit (=1:4)
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g
1.5. SIMULATIONS 21
gure 3b: steady state growth rates as a function of  (=0:5)
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gure 3c: steady state growth rates as a function of  (=0:1)
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For higher values of the habits weight (but, in any case,  < UB) we
have that the contribution of the GEE and the HE act together and, after
some uctuations, the growth rate is constant and common for the two groups,
although group 1 passes, as in the previous case, only nancial capital. In gure
4a we set  = 7:1 , while in gure 4b  = 7:5. In gure 4b the high growth rate
peak experienced by group 1 is very clear: after some periods in which group 2
invests strongly in human capital, the increased return rate on physical capital
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boosts group 1s growth.
gure 4a: dynamics of growth rates with high habit (=7:1)
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gure 4b: dynamics of growth rates with high habit (=7:5)
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In gure 5a and 5b we show how the relative wealth of the two groups evolves:
after some uctuation, as expected from the previous gure, y2y1 reach a constant
value. The higher is , the lower is the steady state value of y2y1 . Again, in the
two gures below we have  = 7:1 in gure 5a and  = 7:5 in gure 5b.
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gure 5a: relative wealth (=7:1)
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gure 5b: relative wealth (=7:5)
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For further higher values of  the economy experience complete specializa-
tion, as described in subsection 2.3. Once  reaches UB the steady state growth
rate and y2y1 are constants, equal to (1   )(1 )
A


1+

and 1 

1  , re-
spectively.
1.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have built a simple general equilibrium model that tries to
shed some light on the e¤ects of a habit-driven intergenerational transmission
of wealth, in the form of human and physical capital, passed through education
or by means of nancial bequeathing, respectively. Our focus has been put on
the choice determinants, rather than on the production features, of the mecha-
nisms that transfer resources from one generation to the next. The key features
included in the model are:
1) Educational choice of adult people for their descendents are primarily
driven by status motivation and not by a perfect forward looking behavior con-
cerning the human capitals return rate.
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2) The "educational story" of each person is an important determinant of her
attitude toward education, that results in her decision about her descendents
education.
3) The "educational story" involves both personal and social aspects of a
persons past (as stressed by Ray (2003)): the familys educational background,
as well as the "educational environment" to which the family belongs, contribute
to form the habit that a person faces in her educational choices.
4) People are heterogeneous both in educational and wealth endowment:
these di¤erent types of heterogeneity could, in principle, drive the economy
through di¤erent paths.
The straightforward translation of these ideas into the hypothesis of a model
are summarized in the utility function (2.1) where the independence of the
educational investment from the return rate of next periods human capital and
the presence of a habit term that includes both personal and average human
capital can be noted, and the composition of the total wealth of a person is
dened by expression (1.1).
The benchmark case that we refer to is an economy without habit10 : in this
case each agent split her wealth in constant proportions between consumption,
nancial bequest and educational investment. No matter what are the initial
distributions of human capital and physical capital in the economy, all the ac-
cumulating variables grow at the constant rate gLB and, as a consequence, the
ratio between the wealth of the two groups does not change from its initial value.
In this case the general equilibrium e¤ect (GEE, explained in section 2.2) acts
immediately and the steady state is instantaneously reached.
The extreme case is characterized by a very high habit concern by the side
of adults: the strong habit e¤ect (HE, explained in section 2.2), forces the
better educated group to pass only human capital through education and the
less educated group to pass only physical capital through nancial bequest. The
resulting equilibrium is one in which the GEE sets a common growth rate for
both the groups due to the lack of degrees of freedom for the two groups: both
are fully specialized in supplying only one of the two production factors and
there is only one value of intensive capital that guarantees a constant growth
rate. The steady state ratio between the wealth of the two groups is, in this
case, independent from initial endowments.
The case of intermediate habit weight induces di¤erent behavior of the econ-
omy, depending on the value of , the habit weight parameter. We claim that
for positive but low values of  that bring to a steady state in which one group
grow faster than the other, initial values of human and physical capital matter:
letting (1.11) to hold and assuming people in group 2 to be more educated, this
group will grow faster than group 1. In other words the group relatively more
educated will end up growing faster than the other group. In the case of the
two groups that begin one close to the other (in the sense of human and physi-
cal capital endowments and, consequently, in wealth) the dynamics are initially
10Or, from another point of view, an economy characterized by a representative agent, where
the hypothesized habit term loses its sense.
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characterized by some periods in which both groups invest in both physical and
human capital. Once the habit of people less endowed in human capital became
too negative, these people will stop to educate their descendents and will pass
only nancial capital. The direct consequence is that people in group 2 will
grow at a rate higher than those in group 1.
The case of quite higher values of the habit weight leads again to the same
groupsbequeathing behavior described in the previous paragraph, but this time
the HE is so strong that the GEE cannot set, alone, the economys growth rates.
In this case the quite strong HE forces group 1 to pass only physical capital and,
due to its intensity, to temporarily make the return rate on nancial investment
very high, through the overaccumulation of human capital by group 2. This
high return rate on nancial investments makes group 1 to grow faster and this
impedes the GEE to set the intensive capital in the economy. Conversely, the
growth rate of group 1 soars until the circumstances reverse: the overaccumu-
lation of physical capital by group 1 leads now to a decrease in its return rate.
At the steady state the growth rates (of wealths, physical capital of agents of
group 1 and human and physical capital of agents of group 2 ) are all equal
to gUB , reached after some smoothing uctuations. Also the ratio between the
wealth of the two groups, at the steady state, is a nite constant, and the nal
value is reached, like the steady state growth rate, after some smoothing uc-
tuations. The more the habit weight increases, the more the above-mentioned
ratio decrease and its limit is reached once that  approaches UB .
The framework that arise is one in which the intensity of the habit motive
in educational investment drives the type of steady state and dynamics that an
economy experiences. We have shown that with little habit the economy will
grow with di¤erent growth rate and only one group will invest in education. If
the habit is quite stronger the bias induced (by the habit itself) in educational
investment makes the GEE intervention relatively stronger and in this case the
"earning advantage" of educated people is eroded by the declining wage: the
economy ends with the same growth rate for each agent, whether or not shes
educated11 .
A lesson that we want to retain is that in an economy in which agents
are endowed with a multiplicity of production factors (in this case two), these
factors are "mixed" in order to achieve the maximum utility, under the given
constraints. If constraints are too reinforced by externalities (or new constraints
arise along the evolution of the economy) it can be the case that some degrees of
freedom are no more available to agents and the behavior of the whole economy
changes in type. In our case a mild habit externality restricts the choices of
less educated agents, leading them to grow slower than the other group because
of the constraint to not invest in education for their sons. With a little bit
stronger habit weight the behavior is the same, but in this case the low relative
intensity of the GEE prevents the better educated group to exploit its "education
11This conclusion is in a way consistent with the empirical evidence found by Checchi, Ichino
and Rustichini (1999) that indicates for Italy (where we suppose habit forces are higher than
in the US) a lower inequality (that in our model must be translated in a lower or null growth
rates gap between groups).
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advantage" and the two groups grow at the same rate of growth. A stronger
habit weight leads to another behavior, forcing each group to choose only one
factor of production to invest in: again the two groups grow at the same rate,
but because of very di¤erent reasons compared with the previous cases.
To conclude, we again stress that our analysis focuses on the choice-side of
the economy, so simulationsresults have to be carefully interpreted: we believe
that human capital production function can not be so "at" as we built it, but
this is the easier way to show our idea. Using our framework a high habit weight
nullies the growth advantage of educated people and, as a consequence, policies
addressed to make the slower group (in principle, the less educated) to catch up
(for example proportional taxation and lump-sum transfers) would be useless.
Of course we have to keep in mind that the conclusions we have reached involves
a linear human capital production function and no government intervention at
all. For example, the higher is the habits weight, the higher are the growth rates
of the two groups (and, eventually, they reach the same plateau): although we
know that a high rate of growth is a good goal for an economy, we nd that,
in the extreme case of high , it comes from a completely polarized economy in
which agentsoptimal choices are on corner solutions. It is straightforward to
claim that, with a human capital production function involving human capital
externalities and/or public education nanced through taxation, things would
be somehow di¤erent.
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Chapter 2
Aging, Technology
Adoption and Growth: a
Taxonomy
2.1 Introduction
In the economic and political debate, especially in Europe, both technologic ad-
vancing and population aging are gaining increasing importance. The political
outcome of these debates is part of the Lisbon Agenda of 2000. Specically, on
the one hand, particular e¤ort needs to be spent in transforming the European
Union in "the worlds most dynamic and competitive economy", by means of
widespread knowledge-based technology. Reading between the lines allows us to
think about this process of moving from a technological paradigm to a new one
as the will of policymakers to actively drive this shift: economic history (and
the related theoretical literature) is full of examples in which the best available
technology is not implemented, due to intrinsic conicts of interests between dif-
ferent actors of the economy. On the other hand, the fact that member countries
are experiencing a rapid aging of the population (a combination of low fertility
rates and a rise in life expectancy) led the European Commission to put increas-
ing weight on it in judging member countriespolicies, especially in the eld of
debt management and sustainability of pension systems. Within this context of
aging population, Cremer and Pastieu (2000) are right in saying that pension
systemsmanagement is mainly a political, rather than economic, issue. Galasso
and Profeta argue that the projected political power of older generations1 can
explain the high support that electors put on generous pension systems, despite
their expected decreasing return rates in the future. Our concern is that also
1They calculate for the UK the age of the median voter to be 45 and 53 in 1997 and 2050,
respectively. Patterns are similar for median voters age in other european countries such as
Italy, Spain and France.
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long run economic growth could be (if not mainly, at least partially) a politi-
cal issue if we allow the process of technology improvement to be the outcome
of a centralized choice characterized by a conict of interests among di¤erent
age classes, as in Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996). The relation linking aging and
technological improvement is, however, not at all clear. Focusing on the age
composition of population could be misleading when we analyze the political
and economic interplays among di¤erent types of economic actors, namely peo-
ple studying, working, or retired. To this end, one of the focal points that we
want to underline is how, in the last two centuries, the roles of students and
retireds became very important in terms of size, economic needs and, moreover,
political representativity. Our contribution is, in particular, to identify and
analyze the two-sided link between aging and technologic innovation: one is
economic and makes innovation preferred by adults once they have enough time
to enjoy their savings in old age. The other is political and refers to the power
that the old people have, once they have reached a certain size, to veto a costly
technologic innovation whose gains can not be enjoyed by the old themselves.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we review historical data on
education, retirement age and life expectancy. Section 3 reviews the literature
on aging, technology adoption and growth. Section 4 proposes our unied view.
Section 5 presents the model, some policy implication and further research lines.
Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Overview on historical trends
In this section we review, under an historical point of view, the age structure of
developed countries, in terms of the role of di¤erent age class in the economic
life. Our aim is to stress how impressive are these changes in the composition of
the population, in the light of the political and economic implication we suggest
in our theoretical model. At the beginning of 19th century people entered the
labor market when very young (almost no public school where in place at that
time), they worked for almost their entire lifetime and used to retire at the
very end of their life. Around 1850 things did not changed very much: people
aged 5-14 enrolled in primary school were less than 10% in United Kingdom
(Galor, 2005) and the expected length of retirement at age 20 was, in the US,
below three years (Lee, 2001). At the same time, life expectancy at birth was
around 40 (Galor, 2005). In 1930 average years of education was less than 8
years and life expectancy rose to 59.7 years, with an expected retirement period
length of 5 years. When focusing just on retirement and life expectancy2 we
note substantial changes occurred in the last century, both in magnitudes and
trends of the series. In gure 1 we show, for US males aged 20, that the steady
2Though the dynamics of education are very impressing, in terms of growth and di¤usion,
in this paper we only address aging matters in term of increasing relative weight of old people
with respect to adult, without analyzing students. We think that a natural extension of this
study is to include the formation of human capital, allowing for a di¤erent class of agent with
specic economic and political interests.
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increase of life expectancy at birth is positively correlated with retirement age
between late ninetieth century 1950, while it reversed once the welfare state
developed. At the same time the percentage of life spent as a retiree changed
from 2.7% in 1880 to 17.4% in 1990, respectively.
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Fig.1. Life expectancy, Expected length of retirement period and
percentage of life spent as a retiree for US males. Souce: Lee (2001), our
calculations.
For european economies these kinds of trends are similar but magnied in
several senses. First of all life expectancy is increasing more in Europe than
what is happening in the US. In 2004 it was 76.3 for EU-12 males and 75.2
for US males, while it is projected to be 82.1 and 79.5 in 2050, respectively
(www.cdc.gov/nchs/ and Carone and Costello, 2006). European welfare sys-
tems are more developed than US welfare state, so european workers retire, on
average, before their homologues in the US (in 2000 US male workers retired
at age 62.6, while in Western Europe the average was 60). Finally, the lower
fertility rates that european countries are experiencing nowadays3 shrink from
below the demographic distribution, shifting upward mean and median age. The
increasing weight of retired population, combined with their historically higher
turnout rate at elections4 , makes their presence always more sizeable and impor-
tant in political choices involving changes that applies to agents with di¤erent
roles.
3Total fertility rate in 1997 was 2.06 in the US while it was 1.40 in EU-12. In 1980 they
were similar around 1.82, then started to diverge. (www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/).
4Galasso and Profeta (2004) report that the turnout rate among people aged 60-69 relative
to people 18-29 is double in the US and 50% higer in France.
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2.3 Aging and technology adoption literatures
The literature linking aging and economic growth mainly focuses on empirical,
country-specic studies about the sustainability of the pension system. A com-
mon feature of these studies is to simulate the projected social expenditure (and
other signicant economic variables such as the amount of savings, the govern-
ment balance, etc.) under di¤erent scenarios of growth rates and demographic
dynamics. Due to this approach, in this kind of framework the interaction be-
tween demography and growth are not explicited. One exception is Lindh and
Malmberg (1999), where they test how the demographic structure a¤ects the
growth rate of OECD economies. They nd, but do not justify theoretically, a
negative correlation between output growth and the share of people over 65 and
a positive one with the share of people aged 50-64. Thus the (relative) aging that
OECD countries are experiencing in the last years should lead to a decrease of
the growth rate of per capita income. Conversely, in developing countries Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) nd signicant positive e¤ect of life expectancy on the
growth rate of per capita income. In this paper we suggest an explanation to
this non-monotonic relation between aging and economic growth, highlighting
the di¤erent determinants of the abovementioned relation.
In the theoretical eld, most of the work concentrates on the study of the
demographic transition occurred during the industrial revolution. In particular
Galor and Weil (2000), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) and Doepke (2004) studied the in-
terrelation between the switch to quality of children (rather than quantity) and
the beginning of a regime of sustained economic growth. A key feature of any
demographic transition is the lengthening of life expectancy of people. Again
in the context of the industrial revolution (and, in general, in the transition
from agriculture to industrial production) work have been concentrated on the
decreasing opportunity cost of acquiring human capital with the lengthening
of life expectancy, in the usual framework used, between others, by Cervellati
and Sunde (2005) and Boucekkine et al. (2002). Both built on a monotonic in-
crease of human capital investment with life expectancy, but the former shows
a monotonic relation between life expectancy and growth rates, while the latter
allows for a decrease in growth rate after some values of life expectancy, deter-
mined by the use of a vintage capital formulation for the production of human
capital. Without contrasting this view, supported by the empirics of Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, we focus on another issue, namely the lengthening of peoples
retirement period. The reason is simple: the cited works essentially study the
demographic transition occurred before and during the industrial revolution,
while the dynamics we observe in the last decades (mainly in developed coun-
tries) show a somehow di¤erent picture. Beside the evidence we presented in
Section 2, Lee (2001) shows that for 20-year-old american people, between the
end of nineteenth century and 1990, the retirement periods length has increased
four-fold and its ratio to life expectancy has increased three-fold. These data
suggest how the retirement period is becoming a signicant share of human life
and how fast this share is growing in magnitude, relatively to the whole lifetime
and the working life.
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The literature on technology adoption is very wide, ranging from Schum-
peterian growth model to agent-based model of knowledge di¤usion. We re-
strict our attention to OLG models of vested interests: the reason is because
in our model we need to aggregate choices between agents of di¤erent genera-
tions and to characterize the property of di¤erent ages within each generation.
The mechanism behind every model of vested interests in technology adoption
is the asymmetric gain that agents experiencing a new technology get, due to
their heterogeneity: heterogeneity can be either within the same generation (for
example skilled/unskilled workers) or between generations (youngs and adults,
having di¤erent time-horizon). The two formulations have been jointly studied
by Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) in a model where three generations are alive at
the same time and the generations themselves are internally heterogeneous in
terms of skills. Their main conclusion is a methodological one: it is relatively
simple to nd a policy that leads to sustained growth, but the very hard task
is to nd the determinants of this policy, once it is endogeneized in the model.
In fact their results are specic to the distribution of skilled (managers) and
unskilled agents, but regularities are hard to nd in determining links between
these distributions and the kind of equilibrium achieved (growth, stagnation,
cycles). Bellettini and Ottaviano (2005) built a model of innovation through
a regulator that reacts to lobbing activity of the di¤erent generations alive in
each period. Cycles of innovation-stagnation can arise in equilibrium and they
are characterized by dynamic ine¢ ciency: the introduction of a innitely lived
social planner would lead the economy to a sustained growth path, with always
increasing technologic level, per capita income and utility. The possibility of
cycles is determined by the short time horizon of old workers: since they would
lost from the introduction of a new technology because of their human capital
that is specic to the previous technology, they lobby for a policy of "no inno-
vation" using their resources. If their resources are high enough to beat youngs
contributions to the regulator, a "no innovation" policy is implemented by the
regulator.
2.4 A unied view
Until nowadays, technologic adoption and population aging have been studied
separately in two di¤erent strands of literature. One paper that attempts to
unify the analysis is Canton et al. (2002) where authors describe a three-period
OLG model in which agents choose to adopt a new technology by means of ma-
jority voting mechanism. Their comparative static results are that an increase
of life expectancy or a reduction in the productivity gap between contiguous
technologies can harm the adoption of a new technology. Our purpose is to
adopt the mechanism of voting on a new technology but to allow for an endoge-
nous increase in life expectancy (the retirement period length of old people)
and a clear separation of the role of di¤erent age classes in the economy. In
our view the mean by which people get their income in di¤erent stages of their
life is crucial in determining their political choices due to the di¤erent interests
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involved (i.e. labor/capital income). Two mechanism are in place in our view:
one runs from technology adoption toward aging and is described in the next
paragraph, the other runs in the opposite direction and incorporates both eco-
nomic and political matters. The former refers to cost-benet analysis based
on the returns from capital investment, labor income, productivity increase and
life expectancy itself. The latter counts for the shift of political power toward
old agents, which are against technology adoption as in the standard literature.
The interplay of these forces makes economies to evolve in di¤erent fashions,
driven by initial conditions and production and utility parameters.
In our model we endogeneize the probability of surviving in old age linking
it positively to the technology level reached by the economy, namely the TFP.
Another way to study this issue could have been to introduce in the model di-
rectly the length of life, rather than the probability of surviving, but this would
have needed more assumptions and a slightly more cumbersome modelling of
the time structure5 . One facet that we want to stress is the nature of the de-
terminant of expected probability of surviving in the old age: as Mokyr (1998)
underlines, in the last century peoples length of life is a matter of widespread
health/knowledge conditions, such as vaccines and health infrastructures, rather
than individual knowledge (such as water sanitation, food-cooking habit, etc.)
that characterized earlier periods. Following him, we decided to relate life ex-
pectancy to an economy-wide measure, such as the TFP, rather than to an
individual-specic measure like human capital6 .
2.5 The model
We set up a model whose aim is to incorporate the demographic and politico-
economic features of nowadays economies, in order to point out the links between
aging and technology adoption. To this end, we design a clear separation be-
tween the stages of agentslife, in terms of economic roles, incentives, political
power and interests. Our economy is populated by agents living at most for
two periods, with a probability pt of surviving from adult to old age7 . In every
period of their life agents vote in favor or against the adoption of a new tech-
nology, that will be available in the next period. The adoption is decided by
means of a majority voting rule and the political weight of an adult and an old
agent are 1 and  > 0, respectively8 . The political power of old people increases
with the number of people alive in old age and this probability is assumed to be
5 In what follows, we will use the terms life expectancy and probability of surviving in old
age as if they had the same meaning.
6 In this paper things would not change because we have identical agents and, introducing
human capital, there are no di¤erences between individual and economy-wide measures. In
fact, both human capital and technologic level are non-decreasing in time in all standard model
of growth. Thus the di¤erence here is just conceptual, but it would change some conclusion
intruducing heterogeneity of agents.
7Though we model the probability pt to depend on the past technologic level At 1, in the
rest of the paper we avoid the use of the notation p(At 1), where unnecessary, and we simply
write pt.
8Detailes are in subsection 5.4.
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positively related with the technological level achieved by the economy. For a
new technology to be implemented after the vote, every agent (adults and old)
has to pay a xed proportion of their income. Adults work and split their net
labor income between consumption and saving for their retirement. Moreover,
once people become old (but before any other events including, in case, dying),
each of them give birth to one adult9 . Old people consume the net return from
their investment and then die. If, at any point in time, a new technology is not
implemented, the net income of each agent coincides with her gross income.
Production uses labor and capital to produce a single output, that can be
either consumed or saved.
2.5.1 Agents
At time t agents of generation t born already adults. They are homogeneous of
measure one and they get utility from adult and old age consumption. The
weight they attach to old age consumption increases with their probability
(whose realization is unknown when adult) of reaching old age pt 2 [p; p]; where
p is the probability of surviving in old age at time t0 and p is the the biologi-
cal upper bound of the probability of surviving. Their ranges are summarized
as 0 < p  p  1. Later we will show how pt evolves. The utility of the
representative agent adult at time t is:
ut = log ct + pt log ct+1 (2.1)
Every adult supply inelastically one unit of labor and get the gross labor
income wt, where wt is the wage, taken as given. If a new technology is decided
to be adopted at time t, every adult has to pay a fraction it = i of her income.
Otherwise, in the case of a no-innovation policy, it = 0. The net income is
divided between consumption ct and savings st. In the old age, she consumes
the return from her investment, net of a fraction it+1 = i, if a new technology
is adopted at time (t+ 1). The budget constraint is represented by8<:
st + ct  wt(1  it)
ct+1 = st
Rt+1
pt
(1  it+1)
(2.2)
The variables it and it+1 are discrete and they can either take the values
i = 0 or i = i, with  2 ft; t+ 1g and 0 < i < 1. We think about i as the
frictional cost of innovation, rather than a tax used to nance some kind of
investment. As in Blackburn and Issa (2002) we allow for a fair annuity market
that redistribute the savings of deceased to people that remain alive: this is
explicited dividing Rt+1 by pt.
9We could restate the model in terms of a three-period OLG, where, during youth, people
are totally passive and once they became adult they behave as described in the text.
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2.5.2 Production
The production technology of the single good in the economy is described by a
constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas function that uses labor and capital as
inputs. At time t production is:
Yt = AtK

t L
1 
t 0 <  < 1 (2.3)
where At is the level of technology available at time t, Kt is the aggregate
capital (that fully depreciates in one period) and Lt = L = 1 is the aggregate
labor. In the production process, a new technology brings about a better way of
producing the nal good through an higher TFP: At = At 1(1+ ), with  > 0,
if a new innovation is chosen at time (t 1), At = At 1 otherwise. A technology
improvement is undertaken if the political majority of the population votes in
favor of it (i.e. the weighted median voter). The new technology is nanced by
the frictional cost that we have dened above: the share i of both adultswages
and old peoples savings.
2.5.3 Probability of surviving
In the introduction we have already outlined what drives our choice of the
determinants of the probability of surviving in old age: we assume that pt
follows a bounded, monotonic increase from p, the initial expected probability
of surviving, to p as a function of the level of technology in the economy, the
TFP parameter At. We model this as an externality, out of the control of agents.
More precisely, we assume that pt, the probability of living in old age of people
adult at time t, is a function of At 1, that is the technology implemented in the
economy during the period before people of generation t are born. The function
is described by (2.4). This means that innovations experienced by people during
their own adulthood and old age do not a¤ect their probability of surviving.
8>>>><>>>>:
pt = p; At 1 < A
pt = p(At 1); A  At 1  A
pt = p; At 1 > A
(2.4)
where lim
At 1!A+
pt = p; lim
At 1! A 
pt = p and p0 > 0. With this kind of
specication, we want to emphasize the way in which technology impacts on
the life expectancy of people. In gure 1 we show one of the possible form of
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the function p(A).
Fig.2. Probability of surviving as a function of TFP
Below the threshold A the determinants of probability of surviving could be
explicited (for example the human capital level of agents) but, since this is
not the aim of our research, we take pt as given and constant, equal to p.
Above the threshold A, probability of surviving reaches its biological limit, and
no technological improvements can further prolong it. Between A and A life
expectancy increases every time a new technology is implemented: again, we
think about extensive innovations, like cures against cancer, better nutritional
guidelines or widespread vaccines that depends on the existing technological
environment in the economy, rather than the human capital that agents are
endowed with.
2.5.4 Political mechanism
The decision to implement or not a new technology is undertaken by means of a
weighted majority voting rule at every period t. The two groups involved in the
voting are adults and old of generation t and t  1, respectively. The standard
result is that the bigger of the two groups is the one to decide upon the social
choice involved. In this case adults weight one and are numerically of measure
one, while old weight pt (where pt is their size, obviously less than one, and 
is their individual political power). In the case of pt < 1 = ~p the adults decide,
while, with an opposite inequality sign, the old set the agenda10 . We call ~p the
political threshold.
10Of course we need  to be higher than one in order to have the political power in the
hands of old agents: what Galasso and Profeta (2004) report about turnout rates (note 4)
helps us in allowing for this case.
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2.5.5 Timing
The timing of the agents relevant choices is described below. Steps from 1 to 4
represent agents adulthood and steps 5 to 9 span the old age:
1) Agent is born
2) Votes over technology innovation (e¤ective in the next period, step 5)
3) Works getting wt(1  it)
4) Consumes and saves
5) Originates one descendant
6) With probability pt she stays alive
7) Votes over technology innovation (e¤ective in the next period, when the
agent is passed away)
8) Gets the net returns from savings st
Rt+1
pt
(1  it+1)
9) Consumes and dies
2.5.6 Optimizations
We now solve the optimization problems of both rms and agents, and for the
agents we will solve the problem for both adults and old.
Firms
Since rms produce in a perfectly competitive environment, the producersin-
verse demand for factors of production, from (2.3), is:8<: Rt = Atk
 1
t
wt = (1  )Atkt
(2.5)
where kt = KtLt = Kt, wt is the wage per unit of labor and, given a complete
capital depreciation, Rt = rt is the return rate on investment in this factor of
production. Since Kt = st 1Nt 1 and Lt = 1, we can write kt = st 1, where
st 1 are the savings of the representative adult of generation (t  1).
Agents
Agents have three choice variables: in every period of their life they vote in
favor or against a technologic innovation policy, and during their adulthood they
choose how much to save of their net labor income. Saving is the only choice
completely under agents control, while votes of di¤erent agents are summed
up by means of a weighted median voter mechanism. In every stage of her
life, an agent take as given past outcomes of the voting mechanism, perfectly
foresee next period values of the economic variables (i.e. future rates of return
on capital) and maximize her utility. She can not commit herself to a specic
vote from one period to the next. Due to the log specication of the utility
function, its maximization with respect to st involves, after replacing ct and
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ct+1, only predetermined variables such as wt and pt and the variable it, chosen
by majority rule at time t.
@ut
@st
= 0, st =

pt
1 + pt

wt(1  it) (2.6)
The optimal saving st is, therefore, a share of net labor income, whose mag-
nitude increases with old-age life expectancy pt. Plugging the optimal saving
into (2.1) we get the indirect utility function as a function of the two dichotomic
choices of innovation/not innovation in the di¤erent periods of her life.
uINDt = log

1
1 + pt

wt(1  it)

+pt log

pt
1 + pt

wt(1  it)rt+1
pt
(1  it+1)

(2.7)
In the next grid we summarize the costs and the direct e¤ects in the case of
the adoption of a new technology in the two stages of agents life.
ADULTHOOD OLD AGE
Cost of Innovation wti strt+1i
Direct E¤ects At+1 ") rt+1 " None
When adult, the cost associated to innovation is a share i of her labor income
and the advantage she gets is a better productivity parameter: this, in turns,
makes rt+1 to rise. When old, she has to pay for a new technology to be
implemented, but she does not experience any direct e¤ect: it is straightforward
to note that elderly people, since they are modeled to be not altruistic towards
their progenies, are always against innovation.
Political-economic outcomes
In this subsection we describe the specic problem the agent (of generation t)
faces at the two di¤erent stages of her life when the pivotal voter belongs, in
every period, to the same age group.
Old age. When old, the agent faces the decision to vote in favor or against
innovation, taking as given everything else. Looking at (2.7) it is clear that the
best choice is to vote against innovation: with no gains from innovation, she has
to minimize her costs setting it+1 = 0.
Adulthood. When adult, she takes as given the variables wt and pt, forms
correct expectations about it+1 (taking them as given and out of control) and
votes over it. Since the utility function is additively separable, expectations
about next periods adultschoice on it+1 do not change the agents problem,
therefore she will vote in favor of innovation if and only if the di¤erential utility
between innovate and not innovate is positive:
uAt = (1 + pt) log(1  i) + pt log

rIt+1
rNt+1

> 0 (2.8)
where uAt stands for the di¤erential utility innovate/not innovate from the
viewpoint of an adult, the superscript I stands for innovate and N for not
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innovate. Note that there is no time subscript attached to the i in the rst log
because that is the ex-post cost of innovation, once the decision to innovate is
undertaken. From (2.5) and the e¤ects of technologic innovations on At+1 we
simplify the expression above:
pt >
 1


(1 + ) + log(1+)log(1 i)
 = p^ (2.9)
We call p^ the economic threshold. It is positive if and only if the denominator
is negative, so we study the cases in which (1 + ) + log(1+)log(1 i) < 0. Given this
restriction we can state that an adult will be more likely in favor of innovation
the smaller is the frictional cost i. Her propensity to vote for innovation will
also be increased by high values of , the direct e¤ect of technology adoption on
TFP, and : this because the adult is willing to pay the frictional cost i only if
she would enjoy a large increase of utility deriving from old age consumption.
Moreover, the higher is the share of production going to capital, , the lower is
the propensity to innovate: this because high values of , through (1  i) 1 in
the expression of rIt+1, drain a lot of net saved resources and make innovation
less attractive.
2.5.7 Intertemporal equilibrium
We can now derive how an economy evolves, starting from its characteristic
parameters of production and utility functions, the shape of the function linking
pt to At 1 and the political weight of old people, . At time t = 0 there are
p 1 old and (a measure of) one adults alive, the generation named 0. Old are
endowed with capital k0. With the hypothesis that at time t  1 no innovation
had occurred, we can write p0 = p 1. Obviously, A0 has to be consistent with
the relation p(A) described in section 5.3 above. To obtain the intertemporal
equilibrium we need that the savings at time t form the capital used at time
(t+1): kt+1 =

pt
1+pt

(1 )Atkt (1  it): The other dynamic equation is the
one that rules how the technologic parameter A evolves: we have At+1 = At
in the case of no innovation and At+1 = (1 + )At in the case of innovation,
and the decision to innovate or not is undertaken by the weighted majoritarian
group.
Formally, a competitive equilibrium, given the initial stock of per capita
capital k0, the initial level of life expectancy p0 and a (coherent) initial TFP
level A0, is a sequence of kt; wt; Rt; At and pt; t = 1; 2; : : : such that:
a) innovation is decided by means of a weighted majority voting. This
a¤ects At+1 and pt+1;
b) each adult selects the amounts of savings optimally, given her en-
dowment and the correctly anticipated innovation policy, market prices and life
expectancy pt;
c) savings aggregate in kt+1;
d) wt and Rt equal the marginal productivity of labor and capital, re-
spectively.
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There are three di¤erent cases in which an economy can end up: we call
these cases stagnant, stopping and growing economy, respectively.
Stagnant economy
A stagnant economy is characterized by a constant steady state per capita cap-
ital k =
h
p
1+p

(1  )A0
i 1
1 
and no innovations at any point in time:
At+1 = At = A0. This equilibrium can be reached under two di¤erent congura-
tions on the initial value p0: either (i) the innovation process is not attractive due
to a too low probability of surviving, i.e. p0 < p^, and in this case is the economic
threshold that binds, or (ii) the political power of old people is high enough to
avoid innovation from the beginning, i.e. p0 > ~p. This is the case in which the
political threshold binds. Moreover, independently on the initial value A0 (and
p0), we observe a stagnant economy whenever  >  

(1 + ) + log(1+)log(1 i)

, that
explicits the condition p^ > ~p. The main point to note is that a stagnant econ-
omy can be the outcome of two very di¤erent economic processes: in the former
is the decision to not innovate, decided by adults, that avoid the economy to
innovate and, as a consequence, harms the old not permitting them to increase
their life expectancy. In the latter is the old generation, due to its great political
power, that makes its choice to be implemented: no expenditure in innovation
in order to sustain old-age consumption. Under a descriptive point of view, we
could view the former case the one of sub-saharan african countries, while the
latter case the one of so-called Old Europe.
"Stopping" economy
A stopping economy is characterized by some initial periods of growth of both
per capita capital and technology and then a sudden stop, once the old get
the majority in the voting mechanism. In order to get this case, we need the
chain of inequalities p^ < p0 < ~p < p to hold. The rst inequality states that, at
least initially, innovation is attractive. For some periods two equations drive the
economy: kt+1 =

pt
1+pt

(1   )Atkt (1   i) and At+1 = (1 + )At. At some
point in time, lets say t = s, pt reaches the political threshold ~p that makes old
generation to be the political majority. This is ensured by the third inequality:
olds majority is reached before the probability of surviving reaches its biological
maximum p. From t = s onward the economy evolves as in the case of stagnant
economy described above, but with the steady state per capita capital ks =h
~p
1+~p

(1  ) ~A
i 1
1 
, where ~A = A 1(~p), that is uniquely dened since p(A)
is increasing between A and A (look at Section 5.3 for details). Without forcing
too much the predictive power of the model, we can think about India: high
fertility rates are slowly decreasing, preparing the eld for a relative aging of
population once the demographic dividend11 vanishes: this could bring in the
11The demographic dividend refers to the time window in which there is an increase of
workforce relative to non-workers, such as retired and youngs (de la Croix et al., 2006).
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next future a stop in technologic innovation once the large share of todays
young people will age.
Growing economy
The economy grows forever, governed by the equations kt+1 =

pt
1+pt

(1  
)Atk

t (1 it) and At+1 = (1+)At, in the case of p^ < p0 < p < ~p. This because,
apart from the initial propensity to innovate ensured by the rst inequality, old
do never get the majority: the third inequality states this condition. In the
same fashion as before, we can think, in this example, to China. In this case
very low fertility rates are beginning to grow, leading the economy to a fall in
relative aging: this is one of the factors that could sustain China in its, at least
for now, steady growth.
2.6 Policy implications
We now discuss some policies and their e¤ectiveness in moving an economy
from a steady state characterized by constant per capita capital to a steady
growth state. First of all, referring to gure 3, in order to have a non-empty
set characterizing the growth region, we need that p^ < ~p. Remember that this
means that, at the some point in time, old people are not too inuent in the
innovation choice and the net adultsbenet from innovation are not negligible.
Referring again to gure 3 we nd that for a poor country, characterized by
a low TFP level (below A^) and, as a consequence, short life expectancy, the
more e¤ective policy is to rise exogenously the life expectation by means of an
improvement in health (widespread vaccines against lethal illness, investment in
hospital, water sanitation, etc.). This policy is represented by the upward shift
of the left branch of the function p(A): once a higher p0 is implemented, for the
given A0, the economy will experience innovation up to ~A = A 1(~p).
Fig.3. E¤ect of widespread vaccine in least developed countries.
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Other policies can be designed in order to shift downward the abovemen-
tioned economic threshold p^, as the mechanism in subsection 5.6.2 describes.
In gure 4 we show that once a lower economic threshold p^0 is implemented,
every economy starting before ~A grows until ~A itself. More important, policies
only oriented toward the narrowing of political power of old (every policies that
lowers ) are completely ine¤ective for economies below A^, since the political
threshold ~p does not bind.
Fig.4. E¤ect of policies that enhance innovationsnet returns
The other way round is true for developed economies: in this case is the
political threshold ~p that binds, so the only policy that are e¤ective are policies
that increase the relative political weight of adults with respect to old people.
2.7 Conclusions
We have presented a simple framework designed to address the links between ag-
ing, technology adoption and growth. We have identied two channels through
which people act in the economy. One is economic and refers to the choice
an agent makes in terms of evaluating the cost and benet associated to the
adoption of a new technology. With this respect, an increase in life expectancy
always leads adults to adopt a new technology more likely, in line with standard
literature. The other channel, the political one, makes old people to be pivotal
in the process of voting upon a new technology once the life expectancy is long
enough. Being the old always against innovation, at some point they will stop
the process of innovation. Our main nding is that technology adoption can be
prevented in the case of both very short or very long life expectancy. The former
case corresponds to the one in which adults are not willing to innovate because
the frictional cost of innovation does not "pay back" in the old age, that is too
short. The latter case refers to the case of a gerontocracy, where old impose, by
means of majority voting, their opposition to technologic improvements, whose
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gains are not internalized by them in future periods. Though the empirical
evidence of this mechanism can be very di¢ cult to isolate, we think that the
implication of aging on economic growth via the adoption of new technologies
needs to be taken into account in the process of designing sound policies in the
future. The political feedback running from aging to technology adoption should
be deeply studied in future research as well as all the other political channels
already addressed such as the problem of pension systems sustainability and
debt management.
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Chapter 3
A Politico-Economic Model
of Aging, Technology
Adoption and Growth (with
Francesco Lancia)
3.1 Introduction
Over the recent pastno more than two hundred yearsthe Western World has
experienced an extraordinary change in the economic environment and in all
aspects of human life. We can observe that, in this period, all OECD countries
have experienced a dramatic increase both in the longevity of their citizens and
in the aggregate and per capita income. Simultaneously, the traditional social
environment changed profoundly: the proportions of the population that were
educated, and that were retired, increased signicantly, causing the proportion
of working people to shrink.
Looking at the details, we can stress some qualitative and quantitative facts
behind these features of the economies. Life expectancy in the last century
and a half increased tremendously: in 1850 it was below 60 years in US (Lee,
2001) and around 40 in England (Galor, 2005), while today it almost reaches
80 years (Fogel, 1994). At the same time, both the shares of lifetime that
people devoted to education and retirement increased. In 1850 the percentage
of people enrolled in primary education was less than 10%, so, on average, the
time devoted to schooling was negligible. Now people, adding up informal (child
caring carried out by parents) and formal schooling, study for around 20 years,
one quarter of their expected lifetime. The participation of people in retirement
shows similar trends: in 1850 less than three years were devoted to retirement,
while today, especially in Europe, thanks in particular to the introduction of
47
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social security systems after World War II, people retire for almost 20 years:1
again, one quarter of their lifetime (Latulippe, 1996).2 In gure 1 we show
how life expectancy and its components, in terms of economic roles of people,
evolved in the last century and a half, for the USA. In Europe some trends
presented here are even more evident: in particular, life expectancy increased
more rapidly (from a lower level to a higher level than in the US) and retirement
length increased more.
Fig.1. Life expectancy and economic roles in the US. Source: Lee (2001), www.bls.gov, and our calculations.
One of the most important implications of these trends is that developed
countries are changing their political structures, moving from a form of "work-
ersdictatorship" to a more diluted political representation: the voices of both
young and retired people in the political debate continually increase, and in-
tuitively their interests should not coincide with the interests of adult workers.
This almost certainly impacts on the composition of the aggregate demand.
Consider, for example, the increasing demand for expenditure in health care for
elderly people, residential structures for retired people, old age entertainment,
etc. Here we are, however, interested in the production side of the economy,
specically in the mechanisms that run from individual and aggregate prefer-
ences to the production process and which could be a¤ected by demographic,
and therefore political, changes. A conict of interests among age classes, in
terms of production choices, will probably arise between workers and students,
if these are innovation-prone, and retired people, who are not interested in tech-
nologic innovation, since their real income is not tied to their own labour income,
which is linked to the past innovation choices. Moreover, a conict of interests
can also arise between young people and adults: for the former innovation has
long lasting e¤ects, since it a¤ects both their productivity in the labour market
once they will be adult and their childrens capacity to acquire human capital.
For the latter, a new technology impacts on the ability of their children to pay
them a pension. These di¤erent incentive schemes would hardly be identical.
1All data come from www.census.org and our calculations.
2For European data see Galasso and Profeta (2004).
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Since our theory rests on the idea that human capital and technology are
the two engines that boost economic growth,3 we analyze how a longer life ex-
pectancy a¤ects the dynamics of these two variables. In this framework we
analyze, by means of a three-periods overlapping generation model in which life
expectancy endogenously changes, the interactions among education, techno-
logical change, aging and growth.4 What we have in mind are the potential
conicts of interests that arise among di¤erent generations. Due to di¤erent
time horizons and economic incentives, individual and aggregate choices can
endogenously change because of the demographic evolution of population.
The purpose of this work is to provide an illustration of how an econ-
omy might evolve when life expectancy mainly a¤ects both private and pub-
lic choices concerning the production side of the economy and, therefore, the
growth process. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we specify what
we consider "systemic innovation". Section 3 presents the model. Section 4
contains a simple dynamic example. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Systemic Innovation
Innovation is a discontinuity in knowledge and, therefore, in production tech-
niques, whose outcome is an appreciable increase in productivity. With the
same resources the system is capable of producing more goods, or it is capa-
ble of producing the same quantity of goods with less resources. We refer to
a systemic innovation5 as to a type of innovation that, in order to be imple-
mented, has to pass through the endorsement of a political mechanism, where,
in general, the interests of di¤erent groups of agents (consumers, producers, the
government, high/low skill groups, etc.),6 do not coincide. The public nature
of systemic innovation, in contrast with the Schumpeterian view of innovations
developed by rms running for the best cost-saving technology, comes from the
historical point of view where the implementation of a new technology is rarely
the outcome of pure prot-maximizing by rms.
The public nature of systemic innovation requires a di¤erent innovation
model in comparison with linear ones based on R&D and, consequently, on in-
novation and technological transfer. Accordingly to Mansell and When (1998),
3 It has been increasingly recognized that both human capital formation and technologi-
cal changes play important roles in economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Romer 1986). That is,
the improvement of knowledge and skills embodied in labour, as well as changes in technol-
ogy, mostly embodied in physical capital, determine the potential for moving the production
frontier outward.
4Recent studies have shown, at least theoretically, that economic growth is helped by an
increase in life expectancy (Galor and Weil, 1998; Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002; Cervellati
and Sunde, 2005).
5We take it that there is no uncertainty in the outcome of a new technology of this kind:
once the decision to shift to the new technology is undertaken, with probability one a pro-
ductivity enhancement takes place. It follows that we are not dealing with risky process of
producing new ideas, but with the process of implementing existing ideas in new ways that
are more e¢ cient, although not for everybody in the same way.
6 In our framework the contrast evolves among di¤erent age groups.
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the systemic innovation model can be dened as a "chain model", characterized
by interdependence between both the development of knowledge and its appli-
cation to the production processes and negotiation of interests among di¤erent
agents. Innovation used to be a linear trajectory from new knowledge to new
product, now it becomes neither singular nor linear, but systemic. It arises
from complex interactions between many individuals, organizations, and their
operating environment.
Following the historical point of view delineated by economists like Mokyr
(1998a, 2002) and Olson (1982), in this study we focus our attention on systemic
innovation as a growth-enhancing technology. Bauer (1995) points out that a
decentralized market outcome seems to be a poor description of many technology
breakthroughs. Economic convenience is certainly not irrelevant, but, as Mokyr
(1998a) suggests: "there usually is, at some level, a non-market institution that
has to approve, license or provide some other imprimatur without which rms
cannot change their production methods. The market test by itself is not always
enough. In the past, it almost never was." (p. 219) Thus, as reported by Olson,
the decision whether to adopt a new technology is likely to be resisted by those
who lose by it through some kind of activism aimed at inuencing the decision
by the above-mentioned institutions.
Consequently, we construct a model in which, for endogenous reasons, tech-
nology adoption is delegated to a regulatory institution, the democratic vote.
We formalize the idea that an innovation, before being introduced in large-scale
production, has to be approved by some non-market institution. Its adoption
is ex-post disposable for all individuals in the economy, but ex-ante the choice
to adopt it or not can be a¤ected by the interests of di¤erent age groups. Ac-
cording to Bellettini and Ottaviano (2005), the central authority can be seen
as a licensing system that has some agency to approve new technologies be-
fore they are brought to the market. Again in Mokyr (1998a)s words: "almost
everywhere some kind of non-marketing control and licensing system has been
introduced". A recent example is the creation of standard-setting agencies such
as the International Organization of Standardization (ISO) or, about property
rights, the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO).
To capture the evolving clash between resistive and innovative interests, we
consider an economy that, at any point in time, is populated by three di¤er-
ent overlapping groups of agents di¤ering in terms of their life horizons and
incentives schemes. In fact, besides the increasing human capital accumulation,
productivity improvements come from the innovation process. A systemic inno-
vation is implemented if and only if there is a political consensus for it: because
its net benets are not equal among the di¤erent age classes, in a heterogeneous
setting there is always room for suboptimal provision of the innovation itself.
Among di¤erent political mechanisms (majority vote, lobby intervention and
so on) for implementing a new innovation, according to Krusell and Rios-Rull
(1996) as well as Aghion and Howitt (1998), we assume that the public choice
is carried out by means of a democratic majority voting where the interests of
the absolute majority of the population prevail.
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3.3 The model
Time is discrete and indexed by t 2 N+: The economy is populated by homo-
geneous agents of measure one living up to three periods: they survive with
probability one from youth to adulthood and with probability pt to old age.
When people of generation t are young they split their unit time endowment
between schooling (et) and working as unskilled (1  et), using the average hu-
man capital that their parents bequeathed them (in the form of an externality).
Their income is linear in human capital and is, in case, taxed for a new pro-
ductive technology to be implemented in the next period.7 From now on, we
call this operation of taxation simply innovation tax. It is a x share of income
and takes the values i ; 0 < i < 1, or zero in case innovation is decided or not,
respectively. As adults, each of them has a single child. Adultshuman capi-
tal is a function of past human capital and the e¤ort they made when young.
They combine their human capital with a TFP parameter that increases if a
new technology is endorsed the period before. Their income is divided between
consumption, a constant share s that goes, in a PAYGO fashion, in paying
their parentspensions8 and, in case, the innovation tax it+1. When old, they
consume the pension that their children pass to them, net of the innovation
tax it+2. The complete scheme of the timing for an agent born at time t is
represented in gure 2.
Born with Ht
Votes over it
Chooses et
Consumes ct
Technology At+1 is in place
ht+1 is achieved
Votes over it+1
Consumes ct+1
Votes over it+2
Gets Pt+2
Consumes ct+2
Fig.2. Timing for an agent born at time t.
Agentspolitical lever is characterized by their ability to vote, every period
of their life, for a systemic innovation to be implemented in the next period. In
order to take into account the increasing and, in some cases, crucial power of old
retired, we assume that young people show a lower turnout rate with respect to
adults and old.9 Thus, their weight in the political process is represented by an
exogenous parameter  2 (0; 1]. All adults and old can vote, so their measure
is 1 and pt, respectively, where pt is the share of old alive.
7Using a school/leisure choice it would have been di¢ cult to introduce the tax on innova-
tion.
8We do not discuss the way in which the pension system is implemented and if it can be
politically self-sustaining, as Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (1999) do. We assume instead that a
commitment between generations is in place and no one can default on it.
9Galasso and Profeta (2004) report that the turnout rate among people aged 60-69 relative
to people 18-29 is double in the US and 50% higher in France.
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Production output is undertaken by rms: competitive rms employ the
human capital supplied by agents as the only input, using a technology At,
taken as given and out of their control.
3.3.1 Utility, budget constraints and production functions.
The expected lifetime utility for an agent born at time t (3.1) is non altruistic
and its arguments are the consumption levels in the three periods.  2 (0; 1) is
the usual discount parameter, while pt is the probability to survive in old age.
In this subsection, despite the time su¢ x, we consider pt as a constant. Thus,
we could just write p, but below we will endogenize it and it will be important
for the analysis to let this variable change over time.
ut = log ct +  log ct+1 + pt log ct+2 (3.1)
The budget constraints in the three periods are as follows. Note that in
every period the incomes are taxed in case a new technology is decided to be
implemented in the next period.
ct = Ht(1  et)(1  it) (3.2)
ct+1 = yt+1(1  s  it+1) (3.3)
ct+2 = Pt+2(1  it+2) (3.4)
Production of nal good in the skilled sector (i.e. by adult) takes the form
of a decreasing return function of human capital (3.6). The TFP parameter At
is equal to At 1 in case a new technology is not implemented (it 1 = 0), while
At = (1+ )At 1;  > 0 in case a new technology is implemented (it 1 = i). At
time t = 0; At = A0 = A: A compact formulation for At is:
At = (1 + 
it 1
i
)At 1 (3.5)
where  denotes the growth rate of the technology and is a strictly positive
scalar. The straightforward expression for skilled production at time t is as
follows, with 0 <  < 1:
yt = Ath

t = At 1(1 + 
it 1
i
)ht (3.6)
Human capital of an adult born at time t (3.7) increases with the human
capital with which she is born (Ht) and the e¤ort she exerted in schooling
when young (et). The human capital depreciates by a factor (1  ) in case an
innovation is decided at time t. The assumption is that when new technologies
are implemented, human capital produced in schools based upon previous types
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of technology is less useful (Boucekkine et al., 2002, 2005). Ranges for the
parameters are  > 0, 0   < 1 and 0 <  < 1.
ht+1 = 

(1   it
i
)etH

t

(3.7)
At the same time, an old of generation (t 2) receives (3.8) that is the share
s of income that an adult of generation (t 1) disbursed in the PAYGO system,
multiplied by the coe¢ cient p 1t that takes into account the share of people
surviving to old age.
Pt =
syt
pt
=
sAth

t
pt
(3.8)
3.3.2 Individual optimization with given innovation policy
In every period of her life an agent takes as given the innovation policy. We will
add the case of majority voting on the innovation policy later. Agents choose
the schooling time when young. From the rst order condition @ut@et = 0 we
obtain the optimal schooling time:
et =
[+ pt]
1 + [+ pt]
(3.9)
It is easy to nd a positive relationship between pt and the equilibrium
value of et: the longer is the life expectancy of people, the higher is the time
investment needed to nance their prolonged consumption, consistently with
existing literature. Substituting (3.9) in (3.7) and writing ht instead of Ht (due
to straightforward equilibrium considerations) we get the accumulation function
of human capital as a function of past human capital, the innovation policy
chosen the period before and the fraction of time youth spend in education. At
time t we obtain:
ht+1 = 

1   it
i

[+ pt]
1 + [+ pt]
ht (3.10)
The human capital accumulation function shows the usual concave shape
(given that 0 <  < 1) and the role of human capital depreciation in the case of
innovation,
 
1   iti

, is clear. Moreover, the human capital augmenting e¤ect
of life expectancy can be evaluated by looking at the expression of et .
3.3.3 Endogenous life expectancy
In this subsection we allow for the level of life expectancy to increase with
the aggregate human capital level as in, among others, Blackburn and Cipriani
(2002) as well as Cervellati and Sunde (2005).10 The probability to reach old age
10Empirically, both private and aggregate endowment of human capital are conductive to
a longer life, although we focus on the aggregate view: on the one hand, demographic and
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is, therefore, pt = p(Ht l); where l is a lag of at least two periods for ensuring
that people are not internalizing changes in life expectancy when optimizing
their human capital level. We impose some restrictions on p(H), in order to get
simple results. p(0) = p0 > 0 avoids the extreme case of a disappearing old age,
while @P (H)@H = pH > 0 replicates the empirical evidence of a positive correlation
between life expectancy and education. Because p is a probability, we assume
that limH!+1 p(H) = pL  1. Simple algebra and the equilibrium identity
ht = Ht allow us to rewrite the expression of human capital accumulation
(3.10):
ht+1 =  1(ht; it)h

t
The function  1 is always greater than zero, increasing in h and, for the re-
strictions imposed on the function p, limited from above by some nite number.
In the case of both innovation and no innovation it is possible to show that mul-
tiple nite equilibria can arise, as we show in gure 3. In this gure we represent
the case of innovation, where it = i: hS1 and hS2 are stable equilibria, while
hU1 is the unstable equilibrium. Of course, in the case of innovation the whole
graph of ht+1 lies below the one of no innovation: it can be, therefore, the case
that if innovation takes place there is room, due to the depreciation of human
capital, for two stable steady states, while in the case of no innovation only one
stable steady state arises. In gure 4 we show the case of no innovation (it = 0):
historical evidence suggests that the level of human capital profoundly a¤ect the longevity of
people. For example, the evidence presented by Mirowsky and Ross (1998) supports strongly
the notions that better educated people are more able to coalesce health-producing behaviour
into a coherent lifestyle, are more motivated to adopt such behaviour by a greater sense of
control over the outcomes in their own lives, and are more likely to inspire the same type
of behaviour in their children. Schultz (1993, 1998) evidences that childrens life expectancy
increases with parents human capital and education. On the other hand, there is evidence that
the human capital intensive inventions of new drugs increases life expectancy (Lichtenberg,
1998, 2003) and societies endowed with an higher level of human capital are more likely to
innovate, especially in research elds like medicine (Mokyr, 1998b).
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the graph of ht+1 is higher and only one stable steady state, hS3, arises.
ht
ht+1
ht+1=Γ1(p0;i)htε
ht+1=Γ1(pL;i)htε
ht+1=Γ1(p(ht);i)htε
hU1hS1 hS2
Fig.3. Equilibria of human capital level in the case of innovation and endogenous life expectancy.
ht
ht+1
ht+1=Γ1(p0;0)htε
ht+1=Γ1(pL;0)htε
ht+1=Γ1(p(ht);0)htε
hS3
Fig.4. Equilibrium of human capital level in the case of no innovation and endogenous life expectancy.
Apart from the innovation policy, increases of , ,  and  shift ht+1 upward,
leading both to higher level of human capital for any steady state and to the
disappearance of the low steady state, hS1 in gure 3.
The fact that (i) the growth of human capital is bounded from above and
(ii) human capital is the only factor of production and its accumulation function
does not depend upon the value of the TFP parameter allows us to study, in
an "additive" way, how human capital and production evolve. For example,
once human capital reaches a steady state, using (3.6) we can keep track of the
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nal production just looking at the innovation policy undertaken. Therefore
the steady state production is a constant level in the case of no innovation
(y = A0(hS)), while it will be an increasing level (at the constant rate ) in
the case of innovation (yt = A0(1+ )t(hS)). The value hS represents one of
the stable steady states that we can nd in gure 3 or 4.
3.3.4 Endogenous innovation policy
Up to this point the innovation policy has been taken as given, either innovation
or no innovation, and the same in every period. From now on we will use, when
necessary, I or N , respectively. Now we allow agents to vote upon the innovation
policy, and the decisions aggregate by means of a majority mechanism. With our
setup the shares of young, adult and old voters are +1+pt ;
1
+1+pt
and pt+1+pt ,
respectively. The more the life expectancy increases, the more important is the
relative weight of old and the less important are the weights of young and adult
in the political process.
Proposition 1 For values of life expectancy smaller than
p^ = 1  
a "workers dictatorship" arises: no matter what young and old prefer, adult
alone will set the agenda in terms of innovation. There are no values of pt
such that another form of dictatorship (i.e. a single age group has the absolute
majority) can arise.
Proof. Adult get the absolute majority if and only if their share is bigger
than 12 : imposing
1
+1+pt
> 12 we obtain, solving for pt, the expression in the
proposition. For similar considerations it is possible to show that both +1+pt
and pt+1+pt can not exceed
1
2 .
In early stages of development process the political power is, therefore, in
the hands of adult alone, while the more the human capital increases, the longer
life expectancy is and the smaller the share of adult is. It can be the case that pt
exceeds p^: from this moment on decisions about innovation need the consensus
of two age groups over three, so the political process becomes a little more
complex. We call this stage "diluted power". The specic cost-benet setup of
the innovation implies that old people are always against innovation: they are
supposed to pay today a fraction of their income for a new technology that will
be available once they are dead. This simplies our analysis: in the case of
"workers dictatorship" this feature is not inuential, since only adult decide,
while in the case of pt > p^ we need to know, to be sure that innovation will be
voted, whether both adult and young will vote for I. Otherwise N will be the
implemented policy.
Our strategy is to check, for all the three-period sequences of policies,11
if agentsvote and policy outcome is consistent with the conguration under
11Being the two states of voting variable fI;Ng and the three periods that an agent live,
the possible streams of policies are 23 = 8: fIt; It+1; It+2g; fIt; It+1;Nt+2g; fIt;Nt+1; It+2g;
fIt;Nt+1;Nt+2g; fNt; It+1; It+2g; fNt; It+1;Nt+2g; fNt;Nt+1; It+2g; fNt;Nt+1;Nt+2g:
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analysis. Let us now dene some variables that will be useful in the policy
setting framework and describe agentsbehaviour in the three di¤erent stages
of their life.
We call vjt the choice of innovation policy voted by an agent of type j (with
j 2 J = fY ;A;Og) at time t and it can take the values f; g, that stand for
innovation and no innovation, respectively. Note that olds choice is always to
vote against innovation, as will be clear below: vOt = ;8t 2 N+. In every
period the function Mt aggregates the votes of the three generations alive and
its outcome is the majority choice:
Mt(v
Y
t ; v
A
t ; v
O
t ) =
8>><>>:
I if

vYt = v
A
t =  and pt > p^
vAt =  and pt < p^
N otherwise
(3.11)
A new innovation will be, therefore, implemented at time (t+1) if and only
if Mt = I.
Now the optimization problem for the agent is to vote, in every period of her
life, upon the innovation policy and, taking the outcome of the voting mechanism
in every periods as given, to allocate her youth time between schooling and
working. We study the choice of the three generations backward, from the old
to the young, at time t. Thus, the individuals under analysis are old agents
born at time (t  2), adult agents born at time (t  1) and young born at time
t. The time structure of our political problem can be represented in gure 5.
t t+2t-1 t+1
vO
vA
vY
t-2
Mt-2 Mt-1 Mt Mt+1 Mt+2
Fig.5. Scheme of votes aggregation.
Old
As we stated above, old people, in the case of innovation policy, only incur in
costs: once the new technology is in place, they will be dead. Their optimal
choice is always to vote against, since vOt is their only choice that has to be
made. Moreover, they do not need to anticipate future political outcomes.
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Adult
When adult, agents vote over the innovation that will be implemented next
period. In principle, the decision to vote for an innovation or not depends on
the di¤erential utility that has to be computed for every future outcome of the
majority choiceMt+1. Due to the functional form of the utility, adult do not care
about tomorrows outcome of the innovation policy: income and substitution
e¤ects cancel out for what concerns tomorrows cost of innovating. They decide
to innovate, i¤:
uAt (Mt+1 = I) = u
A
t (Mt+1 = N) = u
A
t (v
A
t = )  uAt (vAt = ) > 0 (3.12)
where uAt depends on ht 1 and Mt 1. Writing explicitly (3.12), we nd:
uAt =  log(1  i  s)+ pt log(1+ )+ pt log(1  )  log(1  s) > 0 (3.13)
Let us assume from now on that  > (1   )    1: this condition on the
relative magnitude of TFP improving parameter and human capital depreci-
ation parameter states that, in the case that an innovation takes place, the
improvement in the production of nal good exceeds the worsening of the qual-
ity of human capital used in production. Algebraically, this condition makes
the denominator of PA to be positive. It is easy to show that the same consid-
eration will be e¤ective also for PY , which we will dene in the next paragraph.
Moreover, note that limi!0+ pA = 0 and limi!(1 s)  pA = +1.
In (3.13), under the assumption above, adults enjoy a higher utility, in the
case of innovation, the higher is their life expectancy: they experience a benet
from the technology parameter  that augments, proportionally with pt, their
pension when old. Conversely, they experience a cost, proportional with pt,
from the depreciation of their childrens human capital (even though this cost
is mitigated by the elasticity of human capital in the production of the nal
good).
Simple calculations lead to the following expression, where pA is the value
of life expectancy above which adults are in favour of innovation:
pt >
 log

1 s
1 s i

log(1 + ) +  log(1  )  p
A (3.14)
Adults vote for an innovation if and only if they will get higher resources (net
of innovation costs) when old, in the form of pensions paid by their children12 .
The threshold PA is a positive function of i: the more expensive the adoption
of a new innovation is, the less the adult will be innovation-prone. The same
consideration holds for : due to the adoption of a new technology, the more the
human capital depreciates, the less the adult will be in favour of implementing
the new technology itself. Conversely, an increase in the growth rate of TFP
is conducive for a new technology to be preferred by adult. Note that the
elasticity of past human capital in the production of the new human capital ()
12 In the meantime, adults children are became adult themselves.
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is not involved in adults decisions: we will see below that only young take into
account how the past level of human capital a¤ects the next periods human
capital accumulation. The higher the share is of adults income going to nance
olds pensions, the less the adult will vote for innovation.13 The more people
are oriented toward adult age consumption (i.e. for high values for ), the less
they will be in favour of innovation. Lastly, an increase in the elasticity of
human capital in the production of nal good () works against innovation: to
innovate is to make a part of human capital achieved during youth depreciate,
and the higher its e¤ectiveness in production is, the higher the loss is in terms
of pensions paid by adult.
Young
Young vote over innovation taking into account bothMt+1 andMt+2, so in prin-
ciple there are four possible future congurations: fIt+1; It+2g, fIt+1;Nt+2g,
fNt+1;Nt+2g and fNt+1; It+2g. For the same argument stated above, what will
happen at time (t+1) and (t+2) does not inuence youngs vote today. Thus,
they only base their decision on achieved state variables. The condition under
which young will be in favour of innovation is:
uYt (Mt+1 = I;Mt+2 = I) = u
Y
t (Mt+1 = I;Mt+2 = N) = (3.15)
= uYt (Mt+1 = N ;Mt+2 = N) = u
Y
t (Mt+1 = N ;Mt+2 = I) =
= uYt (v
Y
t = )  uYt (vYt = ) > 0
and again uYt depends on ht 1 and Mt 1. An explicit expression of (3.15)
is:
uAt = log(1  i)+ log(1+)+ log(1 )+pt log(1+)+pt log(1 ) > 0
(3.16)
Here young, in case of innovation, again directly benet from the technologic
parameter , but now it impacts both their labour income when adults and the
pension benets when retired. In this last case the benet from innovation is
proportional to pt, so a longer life gives more time to enjoy higher consumption.
The cost structure is similar: a constant cost is due to the depreciation of human
capital when young become adults, through a smaller marginal productivity in
the production of nal good. Another cost, proportional to pt, takes into account
the depreciation of human capital of youngs children: two periods later, in
fact, todays young will get a pension that will be, in terms of human capital,
depreciated because of todays choice to innovate. Therefore the depreciation
term is mitigated by two terms,  and : the rst takes into account the elasticity
between the production of new human capital and the past stock of human
capital, the latter the elasticity of human capital in the production of nal
good.
13There is a strand of literature that studies how pension systems are implemented, why
they are so big, which policies are enforceable in this context, etc. For simplicity we take s as
given, but we think this could be one of the rst improvements to our work.
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Simple calculations lead to the expression of pY , the value of life expectancy
above which young are in favour of innovation:
pt >
  [log(1  i) +  log(1 + ) +  log(1  )]
log(1 + ) +  log(1  )  p
Y (3.17)
Youngs choices over innovation shows similar determinants as adults. Again
the threshold level is negatively correlated with the TFP growth rate () induced
by innovation. The depreciation of human capital in the case of innovation ()
is a factor that discourages young, as long as adult, to vote for innovation.
Moreover, with the assumption about the sign of the denominator made above,
we can state what follows.
Proposition 2 For small values of the innovation costs young are in favour of
innovation, whatever value the other parameters take.
Proof. We need that pY < 0 for some small values of i. With the assumption
that log(1+)+ log(1 ) > 0, being log(1 ) < 0 and 0 < " < 1, log(1+)+
 log(1  ) > 0 and 0 < log(1+)+ log(1 )log(1+)+ log(1 ) < 1. Since pY (i) is continuous and
increasing in 0 < i < (1   s) and limi!0+ pY =  

log(1+)+ log(1 )
log(1+)+ log(1 )

< 0,
the proposition is proved. Moreover, if limi!(1 s) pY (i) < 0, young are in favour
of innovation for any value of innovation costs.
The e¤ect of the elasticity of past human capital in the production of hu-
man capital () can be, in principle, either negative or positive. The interesting
range of pY is, however, the positive one: here @p
Y
@ > 0. A high inertia in the
transmission of human capital from one generation to the other leads to less
interest in innovation because, as in Boucekkine et al. (2002), human capital
depreciates and the more it ages, the more its obsolescence makes it less pro-
ductive. Conversely to the case of adult, for young a higher concern for adult
age consumption  is conducive to innovation: since they can, innovating, boost
the production in adult age, they are in favour of new technologies.
3.3.5 Political outcome
We now deal with the political analysis: we show, for di¤erent parameters
ranges and initial conditions of life expectancy, which innovation policy is un-
dertaken and which policy implications are implied. In table 1 we resume the
partial e¤ects that the single parameters have on the thresholds we dened
above, in particular pA, pY and p^. They correspond to the value of life ex-
pectancy above which adults are in favour of innovation, young are in favour of
innovation and the value below which adults alone choose (since they represent
the absolute majority of the constituency), respectively.
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pA pY p^
 0 0 -
 + - 0
 - - 0
i + + 0
 + + 0
 + + 0
 0 + 0
s + 0 0
Tab.1. Partial e¤ects of parameters on thresholds.
In g. 6, we represent, for generic values of parameters, the function (3.11)
indicating which are the choices of agents. Shaded areas represent the sets
in the space fi; ptg in which innovation is undertaken. Since vOt = ; 8t 2
N+, we only report on the graph the choice vector of adult and young, Ct =
(vAt ; v
Y
t ). Resuming, below the line p^ adult choose the policy, no matter what
young choose. Above pA and pY adult and young are in favour of innovation,
respectively. Note that above p^, in order to implement an innovation, both adult
and young have to be innovation-prone. On the horizontal axis we put the cost
of innovation, while on the vertical axis we have the life expectancy at time t.
Fig.6. Political choices and outcomes. Shaded areas mean "innovation". In brackets, votes of adult and young.
In gure 6 young are particularly hostile to innovation: only for very small
values of i they vote . Innovation is ensured, however, for higher values of i
and intermediate values of life expectancy, in the shaded area characterized by
the choice vector (; ): here adults are "dictators" and they choose innovation,
against youngs will. In gure 7 we again show the function (3.11) for eight dif-
ferent congurations of parameters: the rst (a) is what we call the benchmark,
the other seven are graphed changing, one by one, the values of the parameters
; ; ; ; ;  and s.
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a)
      s
0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1
b)
      s
0.85 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1
c)
      s
0.5 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1
d)
      s
0.5 0.3 0.5 2 0.1 0.5 0.1
e)
      s
0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.1
f )
      s
0.5 0.3 0.02 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1
g)
      s
0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.05 0.1
h)
      s
0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.4
Fig.7. Plots of pA (thin line), pY (bold line) and p^ (dashed line) for di¤erent parameters congurations.
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Analyzing g.6, in case (b) a larger representativeness of young (i.e. higher )
leads to the vanishing of the region in which adult alone decide for innovation.
In case (c) we note that a high concern of adult age consumption leads the
two curves pAand pY to separate: the former shifts up, the latter shifts down.
Moreover, in case the two curves do not intersect, the position of p^ does not
a¤ect the political outcome: adults threshold binds for all (pt; i) pairs, so they
have a veto power against youngs willingness to innovate. A general result:
Remark 3 In the case pA > pY : 8i 2 (0; 1   s) the political outcomes in the
case of "workersdictatorship" and "diluted power" are the same.
Case (d) shows the intuitive e¤ect of an increase in : both the curves shift
down, leading innovation to be preferred for a wide set of i and pt. p^ does
not move and there is room for adults choice of innovation in early stages of
development (i.e. when life expectancy is short). In (e) a higher depreciation
rate of human capital in the case of innovation makes both adult and young less
favourable to innovate. pY is more sensitive than pA to this change: for young a
depreciation of human capital reects in less labour income when adult and less
pensions when old. A very low elasticity of human capital in the nal sector, 
in case (f), makes education almost useless in terms of adulthood income and
people choose to work the most of their youth time, see (3.9), and so innovation
is relatively more preferred because it substitutes human capital in production.
A decrease in the elasticity of past human capital in the production of human
capital,  in case (g), shows a similar e¤ect. An increase in the share s of adult
income going to pension contribution (h) leaves unchanged pY and p^, while pA
shifts upward, shrinking the set of i and pt where innovation is implemented.
Resuming the purely political stage of the analysis, we can conclude that at
individual level, peoples willingness to innovate increases with life expectancy,
the growth rate of innovation itself and, for young, the preference for adult age
consumption. Conversely it decreases with the cost of innovation, the depreci-
ation rate of human capital introduced by innovation, the elasticity of human
capital in nal production and, for adult, the share of income going to paying
old peoples pensions. Once we turn to the aggregate level, that is the political
choice implemented, we look, at the same time, to pA, pY and, more important,
to p^: given the structure of the generations, the economy as a whole chooses to
implement a new technology if and only if the majority of its voting inhabitants
are in favour of innovation. In the case of pt < p^ this maps one to one to the
decision of adult, while for values of pt above p^ we need adult and young to
be contemporaneously in favour. In the case that, for some congurations of
parameters, young are relatively more averse to innovation14 than adult (i.e.
small , large , small ), for small values of life expectancy innovation is not
implemented, if life expectancy of agents increases a bit, then innovation is
implemented without the consensus of young. One more increase in life ex-
pectancy can lead again to stop innovation due to the loss of absolute majority
14With "more averse" we mean that there are regions of the parametersspace where pY >
pA.
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by adult. In the case that a further increase of life expectancy can again bring
innovation, then young support innovation and form a coalition with adult. We
show this example in the next section, analyzing the political and the economic
mechanisms jointly.
3.4 A simple dynamic exercise
In this section we simulate the behavior of an economy characterized by the
features described at the end of the section above. The reason is that this
example can embrace dynamically all the four interesting political congurations
described: (i) an aversion to innovation caused by a too short life expectancy; (ii)
a short-lived innovation period guaranteed by adult workersabsolute majority;
(iii) another period without innovation caused by youngs aversion and (iv)
again innovation, once the life expectancy is long enough. Since we want to
show the possibility of multiple equilibria, we run the simulation for both high
and low initial human capital: with same parameters, in the former case the
economy reaches, in the end, sustained growth, while in the latter it ends in a
poverty trap, with short life expectancy, no innovation and not much education.
We make some simplication in order to have easily readable results. First of
all we assume that, in the case an innovation takes place, the human capital
does not depreciate (i.e.  = 0). In this way the human capital accumulation
function is the same in both the cases of innovation and no innovation. With
this assumption, it comes out that the parameter  a¤ects only the shape of the
human capital accumulation function and not pY . About p(ht), among many
functions characterized by a mapping [0;1)! (0; 1], we opt out for the simple,
but exible, specication chosen by Blackburn and Cipriani (2002)15 :
p(ht) =
p+ pht
1 + ht
; with ;  > 0
Where  and  jointly determine the speed at which the function goes from
p to p and the value of ht where the function shows the turning point that
separates the initial convexity with the concavity that characterize higher levels
of ht16 . In line with Blackburn and Cipriani, we choose to set  = 0:001,  = 2,
p = 0:1 and p = 1.  is bigger than one in order to ensure that p00(h) is initially
positive and then negative, with a turning point in hT = 18:2574. The utility
function shows  = 0:3. In the human capital production function  = 5 and
 = 0:9, while in the production of nal good  = 0:1,  = 0:6 and A0 = 2. The
share of adults labour income going to fund pensions is s = 0:1, while the cost
of innovation is a share i = 0:1. We assume that the political weight of young
is  = 0:5.
15The authors report a detailed analysis of this function: we suggest referring to their work
for all the technicalities.
16For a given value of (); an increase (decrease) in () reduces the turning point, while
for a given value of such a point, an increase (decrease) in () raises the speed of transition
(the limiting case of which is when p(:) changes value from p to p instantaneously, which
corresponds to the case of a step function).
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With this setup, the human capital production function shows the fea-
tures of gure 3. The steady states are four, alternatively unstable and sta-
ble: h = f0; 0:59; 19:56; 1610:96g. In the case initial human capital is below
h0 = 19:56, the economy converges, without ever innovating, to a poverty trap
where the equilibrium youth time devoted to education is eP = 0:189, old age
life expectancy decreases until p = 0:100134, and human capital level decrease
until the lowest stable steady state value 0:59.
In case the initial human capital is above h0 = 19:56 (which corresponds
to an initial life expectancy p0 = 0:349), human capital starts to increase. We
refer to gure 8 in order to give a graphical intuition to the explanation.
Fig.8. The evolution of life expectancy when h0>19:56. Shaded areas mean "innovation".
The initial state is point (A): here life expectancy is below both pA and p^,
so adult alone decides not to innovate. Human capital, however, accumulates
and life expectancy, in turn, increases. This occurs for some periods, then
life expectancy lengthening makes adult prefer innovation (B): the economy
experiences some periods during which both human capital and production (the
latter at a higher speed than the former) grow. Then life expectancy passes the
threshold p^: at this time adults lose the absolute majority and young, being
against innovation (pt > p^), force the political outcome to be "no innovation"
(C). Here the economy evolves, again showing increases in both human capital
and nal good production level, but at the same pace. Once young also feels
the net benets of innovation (D), the economy reaches the upper bound of
life expectancy p, the higher steady state of human capital hH = 1610:96, the
schooling time eH = 0:4185 and the production of nal good increases at a rate
.
Of course the aim of this exercise is not to show the real evolution of a given
economy, but to understand what the political and economic forces are that
lead the economy toward its destiny: to understand the type and the timing of
the policies that need to be implemented is crucial when constraints on human
capital accumulation and/or innovation are in place.
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3.5 Conclusions
Over the past century, all OECD countries were characterized by a dramatic
increase in economic conditions, life expectancy and qualities and quantities
of di¤erent kinds of knowledge. So, it is natural to suppose that the increase
in longevity of citizens is an important factor in determining the life-cycle be-
haviour of individuals. At the same time, it is unnatural to suppose that life
expectancy is exogenous and independent of economic conditions. The purpose
of this paper is to provide a theory that explains how an economy might evolve
when the longevity of its citizens both inuences and is inuenced by the process
of economic development, especially when choices are upon two dimensions: the
private choice of education and the public one of innovation policy.
Assuming, condently, that longevity is positively correlated with the level
of human capital, the increase of life expectancy that economies are experienc-
ing is, in principle, growth-enhancing. However, its e¤ectiveness can be harmed
by, at least, two phenomena. First, building on Blackburn and Cipriani (2002),
we reach their same conclusions about the pure economic e¤ects of an increase
in longevity: due to the positive e¤ect of human capital on expected life ex-
pectancy, it can be the case that lower levels of human capital lead to a too
short life, and this in turns disincentives people to invest in education, giving
rise to a poverty trap. At this stage of development, life expectancy is short
and human capital stock is small. Second, we deal with the political features
of an economy where the engines of growth are human capital accumulation
and systemic technologic innovation. Our idea is that, as we are stressing from
the introduction onward, a variation in life expectancy a¤ects the individual
incentives to innovate and it alters also the aggregate choices of the economy,
since political representativeness of di¤erent age classes changes. Our argument
is that during rst stages of development, when human capital is negligible, life
expectancy is short and retired people are few, the political power is in the hand
of adult workers alone. The decision to innovate or not coincides, therefore, with
adults choice. In the case their incentives to innovate are small (for example
a large share of labour income going to nance the PAYGO pension system,
a large elasticity of the human capital used in production or a high concern
in adult age consumption) they impose to the whole economy a no innovation
regime. In developed economies, where life expectancy is higher, human capital
endowment is large, life expectancy is long and retired people are several, a
political majority that enforces an innovation policy can be achieved only by
means of a coalition. Since elderly people are innovation averse, the only way
for an innovation to be implemented is that both young and adult are in favour
of innovation. Therefore, if on the one hand a longer life expectancy pushes
peoples incentives toward innovation, on the other hand it makes the political
weight of old increase, making the achievement of a consensus for innovation
potentially more di¢ cult. This is true, in particular, when youngs incentives
for innovation are lower than the ones of adult, especially in the case of a high
inertia in the transmission of human capital from one generation to the next
one and when the concern for adult age consumption is small.
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The road that leads to sustained growth is far from being straight: we can
nd path dependency in the human capital accumulation, because in some cases
an initial small amount of human capital can lead to a poverty trap, where the
equilibrium longevity is not enough for adult (or adult and young in the case
of not-so-short life expectancy) to vote for innovation. In case the initial level
of human capital is high enough (or there is no room, in the accumulation
function of human capital, for multiple equilibria), a high equilibrium level of
human capital is achieved, with longer life expectancy. Again, an innovation is
voted if and only if both adult and young are in favour.
With this paper we provide the basis for joining together two strands of the
literature on economic growth that are gaining importance in the research and
political debate: technologic innovation and aging population. We stress how
di¤erent links run between these two phenomena, dening the possible conict
of interests among di¤erent generations and showing how the lengthening of life
expectancy changes the way this conict of interests is solved. Moreover, we
stress how private and public choices combine (or not) in order to give birth to
a human capital abundant, growing economy.
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